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Abstract 
The allocation of resources is a ubiquitous decision making task. In the 
workplace, resource allocation, in the context of multiple task and/or work 
demands, is significantly related to task performance as the commitment of more 
resources generally results in better performance on a given task. I apply both 
resource and naturalistic decision making theories to better understand resource 
allocation behavior and related performance. Resource theories suggest that 
individuals have limited cognitive capacity: limited capacity may limit 
performance in dynamic situations such as situations that involve the allocation of 
attentional resources. Additionally, the naturalistic decision making framework 
highlights the role of context cues as key aids to effective decision making. 
Therefore, I proposed an interactive relationship between working memory, a 
cognitive resource, and allocation cue, a contextual variable. Specifically, I 
conducted an experimental study in which I manipulated allocation cue type and 
examined the individual difference of working memory on allocation behavior 
and task performance. I hypothesized a moderated-mediated effect including cue 
type, working memory, and proportion of time on task on task performance (i.e., 
accuracy and efficiency). The effect of cue type on both the proportion of time 
spent on task and task performance was expected to be contingent on working 
memory capacity. As working memory increased, both time on task and 
performance were expected to increase for participants exposed to either goal- or 
both task- and goal-related cues, as opposed to task cues. Conversely, as working 
memory decreased both time on task and performance were expected to increase 
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for participants exposed to task cues in comparison to those exposed to either 
goal- or both task- and goal-related cues. Additionally, as proportion of time on 
task increased, performance was expected to improve. Results from this study did 
not find support for the hypothesized moderated-mediated effect. However, 
results indicated an effect of task cue on task efficiency. Specifically, individuals 
cued to allocate their attention based stimulus-related features (i.e., task cue) 
completed the task more quickly. Theoretical and practical implications as well as 
study limitations are discussed in detail.  
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PART I                                                                                                                              
Introduction 
Modern-day organizations are plagued with distractions. Consider the following 
example:  
It is 8:00 am on a Monday. Beth has just arrived at her office, and she is 
looking forward to finishing a paper she has been putting off for weeks. 
The paper is a “revise and resubmit”, and the deadline for the revision is 
approaching. Her plan is to prioritize this task; she has given a great deal 
of thought to her approach for the edits, and she is ready to begin working. 
She turns her computer on and opens the file to begin writing. However, 
as is typical of Monday mornings, within 30 minutes, her e-mail 
notifications begin flooding in. Will she continue to focus on her writing, 
or will she stop and respond to the e-mails? Additionally, how might her 
allocation decision influence her writing performance? 
A recent study by Samsung and the University of Leeds suggested that 
employee distraction is widespread. Employees surveyed spent an average of only 
22 minutes completing uninterrupted work each day, which is estimated to cost 
UK companies £250 million each year (Press Association, 2015).  
In modern organizations, employees frequently experience autonomy and 
are networked to other employees. Such conditions require employees to make 
decisions about how to manage their tasks. Decision making is influenced by 
prior choices and incorporates other external factors (Atkinson & Birch, 1978), 
such as organizational politics and task interdependence. Additionally, in many 
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cases, employees’ personal interpretations of their roles may introduce 
idiosyncratic views about how work should be performed and prioritized 
(Sanchez & Levine, 2009). Resource allocation behavior, or how individuals 
partition their cognitive energy or attention among tasks, ultimately influences the 
effectiveness of job performance (Minbashian & Luppino, 2014).  
Performance is generally higher on tasks that receive more attention 
(Minbashian & Luppino, 2014). Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that 
employees allocate their attention to the highest priority tasks that are aligned 
with organizational goals. Allocation decisions differ among individuals, and 
researchers have used a number of theories to explain resource allocation.  
From the self-regulation perspective, it is suggested that resources are 
often allocated to whichever goal or task shows the least progress or most 
discrepancy between current and desired states (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Latham 
& Locke, 1991; Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). Individuals are likely to focus on 
completing tasks that are in need of the most attention to catch up on their 
progress. In contrast, expectancy theory has suggested that some individuals are 
more likely to commit their efforts to tasks or goals with a smaller discrepancy 
between the current and desired completion states (Kernan & Lord, 1990; 
Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). This theory thus suggests that some employees may 
prioritize tasks that are closer to completion. More recently, it has been suggested 
that the decision regarding which task to prioritize is influenced by environmental 
volatility—or, the unpredictable nature of the task environment (Schmidt, Dolis, 
& Tolli, 2009). Specifically, when environmental volatility is low (i.e., task 
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progress is largely influenced by the individual), individuals allocate more 
resources to the task that is closer to completion before they focus on the task 
further from completion; however, when environmental volatility is high (i.e., 
task progress is largely influenced by external factors), individuals allocate more 
resources to the task furthest from completion before they focus on the task 
closest to completion (Schmidt et al., 2009).  
This finding by Schmidt et al. (2009) raised an important concern about 
the allocation of attention in the dynamic or rapidly changing situations that exist 
in highly volatile organizational environments. Specifically, if the task most 
valued by the organization is the one furthest from completion, employees may 
erroneously allocate attention to alternative tasks. For example, an employee may 
decide to focus on a task closer to completion or one easier to complete, such as 
responding to e-mails. Therefore, to enhance job performance, it is important to 
identify interventions to support the proper allocation of attention. There is still 
much to be discovered about the following areas: a) how employees make 
allocation decisions, b) the potential predictors of allocation behavior, and c) the 
performance effects of differing allocation patterns. The judgment and decision 
making literature embedded within the meta-perspective of the person–situation 
perspective has provided some insight into potential strategies.  
As a meta-theory, the person-by-situation interaction suggests that 
behavior is a function of both environmental factors and individual differences 
(Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Lewin, 1939). Within the domain of environmental 
factors or context effects, the current study focuses on context cues with direct 
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reference to the judgment and decision making literature. Specifically, naturalistic 
decision making focuses on describing how decisions are made in dynamic and 
often high-stakes situations (Klein, 1998; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 
2001). The naturalistic approach to decision making departs from the traditional 
models of decision making, which suggests that decision-makers generate and 
compare alternatives, by focusing on how decisions are made under difficult 
conditions (Klein, 2008). Using naturalistic decision making perspective, I 
explore how a contextual element (i.e., cues) influences performance in the 
context of resource allocation. I propose that the judgment and decision making 
literature has provided relevant lens for an examination of resource allocation, 
because the shifting of attention from one task to the next is, in effect, a judgment 
and decision making process. This perspective is aligned with that of other 
researchers who have also promoted a decision making approach to resource 
allocation (e.g., Ball, Langholtz, Auble, & Sopchak, 1998; Langholtz, Ball, 
Sopchak, & Auble, 1997; Langholtz, Gettys, & Foote, 1994). I further suggest, in 
conjunction with the role played by context cues, an interaction between these 
environmental factors and a salient individual difference variable—working 
memory capacity. 
The resource allocation literature has suggested that individual 
differences, such as cognitive abilities, influence the allocation process by 
determining the amount of available resources an individual has to assign among 
tasks and other work demands (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Elsewhere in the 
literature, the suggestion has been made to begin exploring more specific 
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cognitive predictors of job performance (e.g., Wee, Newman, & Joseph, 2014). 
Working memory is one important individual difference within the job 
performance literature.  
Working memory, a source of intelligence, is an important predictor of 
work performance (Krumm, Schmidt-Atzert, & Lipnevich, 2013) and is related to 
the regulation of attention (Kane & Engle, 2003). Specifically, higher working 
memory capacity is associated with more sustained focus on goal-directed 
activities (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Vinding, 2004; Redick & Engle, 2006).  
Implied by this is the possibility that the efficacy of working memory capacity as 
a predictor of performance may depend on the presence of goal-directed factors 
within the environment. This research is a further attempt to gain a better 
understanding of the resource allocation domain. 
Several researchers have acknowledged the value of resource allocation 
research and have called for future research on the process (e.g., Ball et al., 1998; 
Gonzalez, Langholtz, & Sopchak, 2002; Langholtz et al, 1997; Langholtz et al., 
1994; Minbashian & Luppino, 2014; Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2014; Schmidt & 
DeShon, 2007; Schmidt & Dolis, 2009). This research responds to that call by 
expanding on what is currently known about resource allocation behavior. 
Specifically, this research is an exploration of the extent to which cues helps 
individuals effectively allocate attention; and the extent to which this relationship 
is a function of the type of working memory.  
In the following sections, I review the literature on resource allocation, as 
well as the individual differences and situational factors that influence the 
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process. I also introduce naturalistic decision making and discuss its proposed 
application to resource allocation. Specifically, first, I provide a general review of 
resource theories, followed by an introduction to resource allocation as an 
important performance criterion. Second, I discuss the theoretical underpinnings 
of resource allocation. In reviewing these theories, I provide the foundation for 
the predictions that follow. Third, I provide an overview of attention, the resource 
in question, as well as a review of the processes regulating selective attention. 
Fourth, I discuss working memory as a cognition-related individual difference and 
demonstrate how situational stressors work in tandem with this individual 
difference. Finally, I discuss the applicability of naturalistic decision making and 
highlight its underlying mechanism (i.e., its reliance on cues).  
Resource Theories 
 Resource theories (e.g., Hobfoll, 1987; Norman & Bobrow, 1975) are a 
means to explain the limits of human capacity on performance, and they provide a 
general framework to explore the allocation of resources. These theories provide a 
structure for explaining the effects of task characteristics and individual 
differences on the cognitive resource and performance relationship. There are two 
critical propositions of resource theories. The first is that cognitive or attentional 
resources are limited (Kahneman, 1973). The second is that the performance–
resource allocation relationship is influenced by ability level and the nature of the 
task; specifically, low ability reduces the amount of resources available for 
allocation (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). 
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  Generally, cognitive ability is the primary resource in resource theories 
(Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). When people work on multiple tasks that require the 
same psychological resources, their performance on one task may interfere with 
their performance on another task, given the limits of cognitive resources 
(Norman & Bobrow, 1975). At the same time, certain boundary conditions have 
been identified that regulate the cognitive ability-performance effect. For 
example, task difficulty moderates the cognitive ability and performance 
relationship such that high cognitive ability enhances performance on difficult 
tasks (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).  Such finding demonstrates that when using 
the resource theory paradigm, the consideration of situational or task-related 
factors is useful for exploring the effects of attentional resources on performance, 
and how resources are allocated to tasks. 
Resource theories often explain the relationship between cognitive ability 
and task performance, while resource allocation theories go a step further by 
specifically explaining how resources are allocated to tasks (Randall et al., 2014). 
The self-regulation literature is typically applied to resource allocation. 
Specifically, effective self-regulation is associated with enhanced task 
performance: people who are able to self-regulate effectively are able to direct 
attentional efforts to areas where resources are needed to meet task goals (Carver 
& Scheier, 1990; Erez, 1977). Therefore, in situations where resources are not 
being assigned as needed to complete a task, performance may suffer (Randall et 
al., 2014). This is particularly relevant to performance in situations where there 
are multiple priorities or tasks. Employees having to allocate their time between 
RESOURCE ALLOCATON  10 
 
multiple projects need to be able to monitor and adjust (i.e., self-regulate) their 
attentional resources efficiently in order to meet the goals of multiple 
assignments. 
Resource theories can be explained using the dual-process approach to 
cognitive processes. The dual-process model includes two primary processing: 
automatic and controlled processes (Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Automatic 
processing involves low effort and rapid or holistic thinking, while controlled 
processes include high effort and slow or analytic thinking (Evans, 2008). This 
distinction between controlled and automatic processes helps to determine the 
amount of cognitive resources necessary for task performance, depending on the 
nature of the task. For example, a task requiring controlled mental processes may 
require more cognitive resources than one that involves more automatic mental 
processes. Within the domain of resource theories, the dual-process model 
provides a base for explaining the effects of task characteristics on performance 
(Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Norman & Bobrow, 1975).  
In other words, the nature of a task determines the extent to which 
resource limitations influence task performance. Specifically, resource-limited 
tasks are those for which performance is primarily dependent on attentional 
resources, while data-limited tasks are those where the impact of attentional 
resources on performance is only negligible (i.e., performance is independent of 
resource processing; Norman & Bobrow, 1975). For example, a very simple task 
may be said to be data-limited, as performance changes would occur due to ease 
of performing the task rather than the amount of effort committed to completing 
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the task.  Resource theories have aided the development of resource allocation 
theories. 
Resource Allocation 
Making decisions about the allocation of resources is a universal practice. 
People make these decisions in their personal lives to determine how they assign 
their leisure time, money, and other useful resources. At work, this practice is 
equally prevalent because in many cases employees must make decisions about 
how they assign their time and effort among multiple tasks and other work-related 
demands. Despite this reality, very little research attention has been directed to 
understanding performance progress under conditions of multiple or competing 
priorities (Schmidt, Dolis, & Tolli, 2009) or to how effective people are at making 
allocation decisions (Ball et al., 1998; Riekamp, Busemeyer, & Laine, 2003). Yet, 
is has been established that the allocation of resources influences the variability in 
job performance such that performance is higher on tasks with more cognitive 
resources assigned (Minbashian & Luppino, 2014).  
The commitment of cognitive and other resources may help to explain 
resource allocation as a performance outcome of interest in the workplace. That is 
to say, we may be able to extend the extant literature regarding predictors of job 
performance to explain some of the variation in resource allocation performance. 
Predictors such as general mental ability, conscientiousness, goal orientation, and 
self-efficacy (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Sitzmann & Ely, 
2011; Vandewalle, 1997) which are strong predictors of job performance in the 
general domain may contribute somewhat to resource allocation performance. 
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However, to help to better understand the specific context of resource allocation, 
it is important to consider domain-specific predictors that may provide more 
precise predictions of performance in situations where attention is being 
regulated. 
In situations involving multiple attentional demands, an employee may be 
required to determine how best to allocate his/her psychological resources (e.g., 
attention, commitment, mental energy, or effort) between equally important tasks. 
In such cases, performance levels should be maintained for each task in a manner 
that avoids one or more tasks being neglected at the expense of another. 
Identifying how employees strategize the commitment of their effort or time when 
working on multiple tasks is critical, as this helps to determine the direct 
contribution of attention on performance within the context of multiple or 
competing priorities.  
However, the resource allocation problem is often a difficult one to 
intuitively resolve as choice options generally differ in interrelated ways (Ball et 
al., 1998). For example, consider Nick, a marketing representative determining 
how to allocate his time between Products A and B. Prioritizing product A may 
require less in terms of creative energy but may hurt the department’s overall 
performance if product B has a larger income potential. If creativity and income 
are the only valued resources being considered, then this allocation problem may 
be less difficult to resolve. To be exact, if one simply considers which of the two 
outcomes—creativity or income—is more valuable, then selecting between 
product A and B could be directed by whichever option helps to secure the more 
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valued outcome. In reality, however, Nick’s resource allocation decision may be 
far more complex. Choices may be influenced by multiple contextual factors, 
including environmental and task conditions, risk, uncertainty, power, and politics 
(Langholtz, et al., 1997; Langholtz, et al., 1994; Langholtz, Gettys, & Foote, 
1993; Pfeffer, 1992). For example, Nick’s decision may be influenced by his 
perceived difficulty of the two tasks, directions from a superior, or work norms 
and patterns within his department, such as a tendency toward planning or 
interruptions from peers seeking assistance. Therefore, several factors may 
influence Nick’s allocation decision, making the identification of ideal allocation 
a challenging one. 
Within the literature on cognitive psychology, mathematical models have 
been applied to identify optimal resource allocation under different circumstances 
(e.g., Langholtz et al., 1997; Langholtz et al., 1994). These attempts have largely 
focused on identifying and testing ideal allocation algorithms. Mathematical 
modeling, and specifically, Linear Programming (LP; Dantzig, 1963), is a method 
frequently applied in the operations research and management science literature. 
LP provides a formula for calculating ideal allocation strategies based on 
knowledge of the amount of resources available and how these resources combine 
to produce a return. While such resource allocations may be useful for some tasks, 
it may be unrealistic for employees to use them as decision aids as they encounter 
typical and daily resource allocation problems such as how to spend their time 
during the day. More likely, people rely on natural cognitive processes when 
making these decisions—processes that are influenced by individual differences 
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and situational factors. Differences between individuals have been observed based 
on situational factors such as levels of uncertainty or risk. 
 Prior research on resource allocation decisions (i.e., for resources 
including time and fuel, for example) and the influence of contextual factors has 
focused on assessing performance under conditions of high and low risk and 
uncertainty. This includes circumstances where resources are limited and the 
potential for loss is high. For example, using a Coast Guard scheduling task, 30 
participants were challenged with scheduling two boats to maximize operating 
hours while ensuring minimum patrol hours. Participants were warned about the 
history of unforeseen incidences resulting in losses and had a fixed amount of fuel 
and personnel hours for completing the task (see Langholtz et al., 1994). 
Participants were assigned to either a low, moderate, or high difficulty condition 
with difficulty intensifying as the amount of time required to operate the boats 
increased. Results demonstrated that participants’ overall performance 
approached optimal levels. Participants were better able to complete the task 
when task difficulty was low. Under conditions of high difficulty, success was 
most likely for those who appropriately allocated resources based on the optimal 
allocation determined by an LP model (Langholtz et al., 1994). 
Furthermore, while those under conditions of certainty and risk self-
corrected to avoid missed opportunities for allocation, those under conditions of 
uncertainty were significantly less likely to do so. Evidence also suggests that 
participants were able to learn more efficient resource allocation strategies 
(Langholtz et al., 1993). Collectively, these results suggest that research attention 
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to the process of resource allocation is promising. Specifically, given the 
association between effective resource allocation and performance, and evidence 
that situational factors and learning may enhance performance, researchers and 
practitioners may benefit from having a better understanding of how resource 
allocation decisions occur.  
The Allocation of Attention 
 Employees are faced with multiple task demands, such as writing reports, 
attending meetings, meeting deadlines, and attending to e-mails (many times non-
critical e-mails). These tasks represent constant streams of information that 
require attention. Attention is “the taking possession by the mind, in clear and 
vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or 
trains of thought… [I]t implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal 
effectively with others” (James, 1883, p. 381–382). Attention may be studied 
from either a divided or selective paradigm. In both cases, the assumption is that 
attentional resources are limited (Kahneman, 1973). 
To effectively manage their time, employees must selectively process 
relevant aspects of work-related demands while ignoring irrelevant portions as 
called for by the situation. This is known as selective attention, which is the 
“differential processing of simultaneous sources of information” (Johnston & 
Dark, 1986, p. 44). While specific to auditory stimuli, the cocktail party problem 
(Cherry, 1953) is a good illustration of selective attention. The cocktail party 
effect occurs when an individual is presented with a variety of stimuli, similar to 
those presented while at a cocktail party, including multiple and simultaneous 
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conversations in the background. However, it may be possible to selectively focus 
on one dominant conversation despite the distractions. Similarly, an employee 
may be bombarded with a litany of responsibilities but can consciously focus (i.e., 
selectively attend) on completing one task at a given time.  
Several models have been used to explain selective attention. The 
Broadbent Filter Model (Broadbent, 1958) explains how information becomes 
ignored during the selection process. This model suggests that individuals focus 
on the physical features of information (e.g., color or visual information, pitch of 
auditory stimuli) very early in the selection process. Therefore, unattended cues 
are filtered out on the basis of physical features and not transferred to short-term 
memory. The second model of selective attention, Treisman’s Attenuation Model 
(Treisman, 1960), further builds on the Filter Model to explain how and why 
individuals are able to switch their attention suddenly from focusing on writing a 
report to responding to a critical e-mail. This theory suggests that rather than 
being completely blocked out, critical but unattended information (such as a 
secondary task), is attenuated and transferred to short-term memory. Further, late 
selection models have suggested that even unattended information is processed 
and that relevant information receives conscious awareness (Deutsch & Deutsch, 
1963). The major distinction between early (i.e., the Filter Model) and late 
selection models is whether the selection of what to attend to occurs before or 
after processing. 
Still, one may respond to an instant task request, such as an urgent e-mail, 
while focusing on a different task (i.e., by divided attention).  Divided attention, 
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or processing multiple sources of information at the same time (Johnston & Dark, 
1986) may impair performance, as this requires performing multiple processes 
simultaneously as in multi-tasking situations. From the perspective of capacity 
theory, being selective is necessary, as attentional resources are limited 
(Kahneman, 1973). Therefore, based on this assumption, employees would need 
to attend to their e-mail or complete a report, rather than attempting to do both 
simultaneously. At the same time, assuming that all tasks competing for attention 
are relevant to the greater goal of the organization, the management of attention is 
more dynamic a process than simply selecting a single task to prioritize. In other 
words, effective performance may depend on making changes to the allocation of 
attention, effort, or time as called for by the situation. 
Flexibility of attention is required to cognitively manage multiple 
processes (Kahneman, 1973). What an individual attends to is determined by 
goals, and attention helps to create a balance between the need for focus and 
flexibility (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010). Therefore, in the management of multiple 
priorities or tasks, an employee will be required to effectively balance the need to 
focus on certain priorities with the ability to be flexible enough to switch between 
tasks, as required. This process of attention regulation is governed by 
performance goals which enable self-regulation (Locke & Latham, 2002). Further, 
human behavior is influenced by the interaction between goals and their 
associated stimuli (Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001). For example, an 
individual may determine which task to focus their attention on based on 
departmental goal (i.e., to complete report by the end of the month) or based a 
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feature of the task itself (e.g., task progress or difficulty). This determination is 
based on the dominant mode of processing being employed—top-down or 
bottom-up. 
 Top-down regulation of attention. 
 Top-down regulation, or endogenous control (Posner, 1980), refers to 
attentional regulation that is cognitively derived or goal-driven (Pashler et al, 
2001). This system of control functions to activate related cognitive structures and 
inhibits competing processes to prevent interruptions (Lord & Levy, 1994). To 
illustrate, this would equate to prioritizing tasks based on their relationship to an 
overarching goal. As a result, thinking back to the context in the opening 
example, if one’s principal goal is to enhance teaching, and not to enhance 
research productivity, then tasks related to teaching would be prioritized before 
those related to other activities. Goal setting may facilitate more effective 
teaching; for example, a goal to increase teaching evaluation scores and the 
monitoring of that goal based on feedback can help to regulate attention and effort 
in light of that goal.  The goal setting and feedback processes function in support 
of top-down regulation of attention. 
 Top-down regulation is also a feature of deliberate task preparation 
(Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston 2001), which can provide some advantages to 
task performance and mirrors the literature on goal-setting and planning. Top-
down regulation may involve setting goals and calculating goal progress. Goals 
are critical for directing attention and effort, energizing, driving persistence, and 
stimulating task-relevant knowledge (Locke & Latham, 2002). Additionally, 
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given that resource allocation represents a dynamic decision making process 
accounting for evolving situational demands (Atkinson & Birch, 1978), the use of 
a top-down strategy may be critical for success. That is to say, the development of 
a specific plan before implementation may help reduce any ambiguity inherent in 
allocation tasks. Drawing on the literature on planning, creating a strategy prior to 
beginning a task is associated with several benefits. Planning facilitates goal 
development (i.e., intellectual benefit) and helps to stimulate confidence and 
persistence (i.e., volitional benefit) toward a task (Gollwitzer, 1996). As is 
established in the literature, goal-setting is associated with enhanced performance 
(Locke & Latham, 2002). Therefore, the implicit parallel between planning and 
the top-down regulation strategy suggests that approach may provide a 
performance advantage. 
 Elsewhere in the literature, top-down processing resembles the ‘search and 
schedule’ strategy (SAS), which is a resource allocation strategy involving 
detailed search and scheduling of resources prior to approaching tasks (Ball et al., 
1998). The SAS strategy involves an overall assessment of the allocation problem 
and calculations to arrive at the optimal solution prior to beginning a task. This 
strategy represents a “less sophisticated” version of the LP solution and is similar 
to strategies from the problem-solving literature, including means-end analysis 
and hill-climbing (Ball et al., 1998, p. 73). Consistent with the dual-process 
approach to thinking and reasoning, one could suspect that the processes involved 
in this approach would therefore be somewhat consistent with more controlled 
and analytical cognitive processing (Evans, 2008; Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
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 While it has been established that goal-driven processes such as attending 
to goal-setting (e.g., Locke & Latham, 2002) and planning (e.g., Gollwitzer, 
1996) are advantageous to task performance, there are situations in which these 
benefits are limited. For example, when individuals are given a goal during 
training, performance tends to be lower compared to those given no goal, 
especially for individuals with low cognitive ability (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). 
This effect, explained by the limited capacity perspective (Kahneman, 1973), is 
likely to be seen because the self-regulation process demands attentional 
resources, which further stresses the limited capacity of those with low cognitive 
ability. As a result, these individuals are unable to focus as much on learning, as 
their attentional resources are also being devoted to self-regulating their goal 
progress. While performance may increase over time for these individuals, their 
performance may continue to lag behind both their high cognitive ability 
counterparts and those with low cognitive ability who are not assigned a goal 
(Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). This effect is seen during the initial phase of skill 
acquisition, or when a task is novel or complex—during which time, the demand 
for cognitive resources is highest (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).  
Research from the neuroscience literature also supports the negative effect 
of goals on performance in some situations. In a study looking at dynamic 
decision making, participants were asked to either predict or control the health of 
an infant. During the learning phase of the task, participants were given outcome 
feedback based on their performance. Unexpectedly, this feedback was found to 
impair learning and transfer (Osman, 2012). The author suggested that the 
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negative effect of feedback was a result of the nature of the task presented; a 
caution regarding the value of feedback that has been supported by others (e.g., 
Harvey, 2011; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996). Specifically, for complex judgment and 
decision making tasks, such as dynamic decision making, decision-makers engage 
in constant learning, as decisions are impacted by previous decisions and other 
factors within the task environment. More specifically, in dynamic decision 
making tasks (such as resource allocation), decision-makers will be required to 
constantly use the feedback provided to develop new knowledge—a process 
called exploration—and use their existing knowledge to make the decisions 
required of the task being completed—a process called exploitation (Harvey, 
2011). For example, while managing time between a main goal (e.g., improving 
teaching performance), and other priorities, receiving weekly feedback on goal 
progress throughout the quarter will be cognitively expensive. In other words, 
reassessing and redistributing effort based on ongoing feedback increases the 
cognitive load associated with these tasks which may ultimately impair 
performance. This is especially likely if an individual’s cognitive resources are 
limited (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).   
Given that top-down processing is associated with goal-driven cognitive 
processes, this may include the regulation of goal-related information such as 
feedback on goal progress. As such, rather than relying on top-down attentional 
regulation exclusively, there may be some benefit to exploring an alternative 
strategy for effective resource allocation for certain individuals.  
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Bottom-up regulation of attention. 
Bottom-up regulation, or exogenous control (Posner, 1980), is driven by 
features related to the stimulus in question (Pashler et al., 2001). Further, 
regulation based on this type of process often results in attention being captured 
by features of the stimulus that “pop out” based on their dissimilarity with the 
other features in the stimulus environment (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Using 
visual attention to illustrate, using bottom-up regulation, an item will be more 
likely to command one’s attention if its features or colors are distinct from that of 
its background. Similarly, a dominant bottom-up approach would result in task 
prioritization based on task-related factors including identified discrepancies 
between one’s current and desired goal progress or time to task completion (Lord 
& Levy, 1994), rather than consideration of the macro-level goals. As such, an 
individual may decide to focus on task A over B because task A is closer to being 
completed (i.e., less time intensive) even if task B is more in-line with a 
superordinate goal. Being stimulus-driven, bottom-up attention may be 
involuntarily directed (Schreij, Owens, & Theeuwes, 2008). For example, an 
employee may commit unplanned time or attention to handling emergency 
situations at work. This may include completing tasks that are not directly related 
to meeting an established goal but require attention nonetheless.  
This approach to attentional regulation resembles the ‘consume and check’ 
(CAC) strategy. The CAC strategy involves some initial planning at the beginning 
of tasks but follows with daily “consumption” of resources and constant checking 
to avoid over- or under-use of available resources as time processes (Ball et al., 
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1998). The CAC strategy equates to choosing a task on the first day of the week 
and constantly checking progress to the resources available as the week 
progresses to consume the final share of resources. This implies a routine-like 
nature of consuming and checking resources (i.e., satisfy current needs), in 
comparison to the more cognitively complex process of solving and scheduling 
(i.e., seeking to maximize resources). In comparison to the SAS strategy, the CAC 
strategy may be more data-limited (i.e., performance is independent of resource 
processing; Norman & Bobrow, 1975). Specifically, using the CAC strategy may 
rely less on the cognitive resources given the routine-nature and less complex 
process involved. Additionally, the CAC strategy may be considered more 
responsive than proactive (Gonzalez et al., 2002). At the same time, the success of 
this strategy depends on the manner in which allocation decisions are made in the 
moment. 
Using the CAC strategy, in comparison to the SAS strategy, individuals 
have demonstrated an inability to meet overall goals due to allocation errors at the 
end of the tasks. Specifically, using a meal-scheduling task, some participants 
were unable to consume the minimum daily meal required on the last day of the 
week as a result of over-consumption earlier in the week (Ball et al., 1998). This 
implies that the approach utilized during the decision making process may be a 
function of perception and judgment. 
 Comparison of top-down and bottom-up allocation. 
 A number of differences have been identified between behaviors 
associated with top-down and bottom up attention. For example, top down visual 
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attention is described as sustained and takes longer to deploy than its transient 
bottom-up alternative (Pinto, van der Leij, Sligte, Lamme, & Scholte, 2013). 
Within the domain of resource allocation specifically, findings appear to suggest 
differences in allocation as influenced by attentional focus. On one hand, while 
working on multiple goals, participants’ goal priorities were influenced by a 
discrepancy between their current and desired goal progress—a bottom-up 
influence (e.g., Schmidt & DeShon, 2007). That is, participants prioritized the 
task with the greater discrepancy. On the other hand, participants may also 
prioritize whichever task is closer to being completed (Kernan & Lord, 1990), a 
demonstration of a top-down attention. This difference was suggested as being 
attributable to the nature of the tasks used by the researchers in the studies 
reported (Schmidt et al., 2009). A bottom-up influence was believed to be in 
response to the dynamic task used (Schmidt & DeShon, 2007) while a top-down 
influence a function of the static task used (Kernan & Lord, 1990). This 
difference in allocation pattern has also varied based on goal orientation. To be 
exact, those with a high mastery orientation (i.e., individuals who want to increase 
competence; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) generally prioritize based on large goal 
discrepancy while those with a high performance avoid orientation (i.e., 
individuals who want to avoid negative judgments; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) are 
more likely to allocate attention to goals close to completion (i.e., least discrepant; 
Schmidt et al., 2009). These findings suggest that inter-individual factors can 
influence resource allocation patterns. In addition to allocation behavior, any 
associated performance differences are also of concern. 
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In the seminal work conducted by Ball and colleagues (1998), which aided 
the identification of the CAC and SAS resource allocation strategies, a few 
differences were observed between the verbal protocols of participants, using the 
CAC and SAS strategies. First, it was noticed that the majority of participants 
used the CAC strategy (71%).  Others have also found the use of the CAC 
strategy more common among participants and have attributed this difference to 
CAC being a less cognitively complex approach (Gonzalez et al., 2002). Second, 
participants using the SAS strategy had better performance than those using the 
CAC strategy in less complex resource allocation tasks. There were no differences 
between strategies (i.e., on performance) when the task was more complex. 
However, given the sample size (i.e., 20 participants) used in the study, additional 
research is warranted as this absence of an effect may have been due to a lack of 
power. 
Research has also attempted to determine whether people are capable of 
solving resource allocation decisions in an optimal manner (e.g., similar to the LP 
approach). Evidence suggests that under certain conditions (i.e., certainty, risk) 
individuals are able to identify optimal solutions. Of those participants who 
identified the optimal solution, all used the SAS strategy (Gonzalez et al., 2002). 
This further supports the idea that the SAS strategy may be superior to the CAC 
strategy. Given the limited attention to these “intuitive” (e.g., SAS and CAC)—in 
comparison to mathematical strategies (i.e., LP)—in resource allocation decision 
making (Ball et al., 1998), additional work continues to examine more intuitive 
allocation strategies. Specifically, as referenced above, research has begun to 
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explore the individual differences associated with different allocation behaviors 
(e.g., Schmidt et al., 2009). This proposed research continues this trend toward a 
focus on individual differences by examining the effect of working memory.  
Working Memory Capacity 
 Attention directs cognitive resources to selected activities or tasks, and 
working memory aids this process. Working memory is a cognitively-based 
individual difference that actively preserves small pieces of information to be 
utilized during cognitive task activities (Cowan et al., 2005). Working memory 
biases attention to prioritized activities (Lavie et al., 2004) and is related to the 
ability to focus on goal-relevant information (Redick & Engle, 2006). In other 
words, working memory mirrors executive control (Engle, 2002). Therefore, this 
construct is relevant to resource allocation as it may facilitate the ability to 
maintain attention and ignore distractions during task performance. In fact, within 
the multitasking literature, the dimensions of working memory capacity predict 
both performance speed and error (Buhner, Konig, Pick, & Krumm, 2006). 
Therefore, in this study, it is expected that working memory capacity will affect 
both performance efficiency (i.e., time to completion) and accuracy (i.e., absence 
of errors). To better understand how working memory capacity plays a role in 
affecting these performance outcomes, it is important to understand the 
dimensions and structure of working memory. 
  Working memory includes three primary dimensions: storage in the 
context of processing, coordination, and supervision (Oberauer, Sub, Wilhelm, & 
Wittman, 2003). Storage in the context of processing is the ability to briefly retain 
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information even after presented. This is useful within the context of resource 
allocation for the maintenance of performance over time. Namely, should a 
stimulus-driven factor, such as an emergency e-mail at work, require the need to 
pause from working on a goal-directed activity, the ability to retain information 
from the primary task may help to preserve performance when returning to the 
task. Therefore, the benefit that high working memory capacity has on multi-
tasking performance may be extended to resource allocation performance. The 
second dimension of working memory is coordination, which refers to the ability 
to “build relations between elements and to integrate relations into structures” 
(Oberauer et al., 2003, p. 169).  This dimension may also be useful if switching 
between tasks to integrate activities to improve efficiency. For example, if 
allocating attention between two writing projects, it would be helpful to 
coordinate the writing process between these distinct projects in such a way as to 
allow working on one to facilitate, rather than inhibit, working on the other. 
Finally, supervision, the third dimension of working memory, is related to 
monitoring activities to ensure that relevant tasks are prioritized and irrelevant 
tasks do not cause a distraction.   
 With regards to the structure of working memory, four primary systems 
have been identified: the central executive, the phonological loop, the visuospatial 
sketchpad, and the episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2003). The central executive is the 
most critical system and effects control via: a) patterns or schemas which are 
influenced by environmental cues, and b) the supervisory activating system which 
intervenes when control processes are lacking (Baddeley, 2003). Therefore, the 
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central executive is implicated when behavior is driven by superordinate mental 
constructs such as goals—this speaks to the first role of the central executive. 
However, when cognitive resources are limited, the central executive may also 
function to influence behavior by supervising the actions of its supporting 
systems. These supporting systems include the phonological loop and the 
visuospatial sketchpad. The phonological loop is the system of sound processing 
that supports the acquisition of language (Baddeley, Gathercole, & Papagno, 
1998) and is responsible for temporarily storing phonological information to 
memory using a rehearsal process; similarly, the visuospatial sketchpad stores and 
manipulates visual and spatial information for short periods (Baddeley, 2003). 
Finally, the episodic buffer, (Baddeley, 2000) facilitates integration between the 
phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad, and long-term memory (Baddeley, 
2003). See Figure 1 for a visual representation of the systems involved in working 
memory.  



















Figure 1. The multi-component model of working memory. Adapted from 
Baddeley (2003). 
 
The role of working memory in the allocation of attention. 
Working memory is an important predictor of performance in situations 
requiring multi-task performance (Hambrick, Oswald, Darowiski, Rench, & Brou, 
2010; Konig, Buhner, & Murling, 2005). Additionally, working memory predicts 
the likelihood of exercising more cognitive control (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & 
Engle, 2001), the likelihood of multi-tasking (Sanbonmatsu, Strayer, Medeiros-
Ward, & Watson, 2013), and the ability to avoid interference (Kane & Engle, 
2003). Recent meta-analytic evidence also suggests that limited working memory 
capacity is associated with an increased likelihood of mind wandering, which 
ultimately reduces performance (Randall, et al., 2014). Given that top-down 
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2001), it seems reasonable to expect an association between high working 
memory capacity and top-down processing (Sobel, Gerrie, Poole, & Kane, 2007) 
Furthermore, working memory capacity is associated with enhanced 
performance on tasks related to ignoring distractions (e.g., Sobel et al., 2007). For 
example, using a visual search task, search efficiency was not influenced for 
subjects relying on bottom-up processes but was enhanced for those relying on 
top-down processes (Sobel et al, 2007). A possible explanation for this could be 
that bottom-up processes are facilitated by stimulus-related factors while top-
down processes are more heavily reliant on cognitive resources such as working 
memory.  As such, we may expect to find an association between top-down 
attention, high working memory capacity, and performance within the context of 
resource allocation. 
In the preceding review, I provided an overview of the general principles 
of resource theory. Additionally, I narrowed in on the regulation of attention and 
highlighted the role of working memory in the process. Limits to working 
memory capacity interfere with the appropriate regulation of attention, which 
poses a challenge for successful task performance in work environments that 
require multitasking. A reliance on working memory capacity is likely to increase 
as jobs increase in complexity and workload. Therefore, identifying 
environmental factors that interact with working memory capacity to affect 
performance in these conditions is important. The allocation of attention is 
heavily dependent on judgment and decision making processes. For example, 
having identified that working on my dissertation is presently my most important 
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goal, directing my attention to preparing an activity for the class I am teaching for 
a portion of my day today involves an active decision of not doing one thing and 
doing another instead. While several decision making frameworks exist that may 
provide a viable suggestion to the resource allocation dilemma, I will apply the 
naturalistic decision making model. 
Naturalistic Decision Making 
 Within the tradition of decision making research, several recent dominant 
paradigms have influenced theoretical and practical applications (Highhouse, 
Dalal, & Salas 2014). One is bounded rationality (Simon, 1972), which highlights 
the limits of human cognition and influenced research on heuristics and biases 
(i.e., Kahneman’s & Tversky’s work). Another is adaptive decision making, 
including the Brunswick lens model (i.e., Hammond, 1955), and research from the 
ABC group suggesting that the “fast and frugal” nature of heuristics can enhance 
decision making (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). A third approach focuses 
on real-life decision making, influenced by more dynamic realities. One example 
of this approach is naturalistic decision making (Lipshitz et al., 2001). 
 Naturalistic decision making seeks to “understand how people make 
decisions in real-world contexts that are meaningful and familiar to them” 
(Lipshitz et al., 2001, p. 332). This approach to decision making responds to the 
shortcomings of traditional decision making approaches that are incompatible 
with the uncertainty associated with organizational life (Grossman et al., 2014). 
This supports the applicability of a naturalistic decision making model to the 
problem of resource allocation. To be precise, typical work situations are believed 
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to include some uncertainty and be dynamic in nature—thereby complicating the 
decisions about where and how attention should be allocated. For example, going 
back to the opening example - consider that Beth has prioritized the goal of 
completing the edits needed for the revise and resubmit. This task may support the 
goal she has of increasing her research productivity.  
However, applying a traditional decision making framework—prospect 
theory which models real-life choices, for example—a question exists of how she 
would determine the value of the potential gain to be achieved from completing 
this task when there is no guarantee that completing the edits will result in her 
paper being accepted for publication. Additionally, further uncertainty relates to 
how she would quickly and accurately weight the value of revising one paper 
versus another to decide which to prioritize. Therefore, while more recent models 
of decision making deviated from the classical or rational choice model of 
decision making where decision-makers were assumed to be rational thinkers, an 
understanding of decision making in more dynamic contexts is still warranted 
(Lipshitz et al., 2001). The limitation of applying traditional decision making 
theories to explain how we allocate attention is therefore challenging given the 
dynamic nature of resource allocation.  
Consequently, naturalistic decision making might be a good fit for 
explaining and enhancing allocation decisions. Eight distinguishing features are 
typical of naturalistic decision making contexts. These include: ill-structured 
problems, uncertain and dynamic environments, shifting and ill-defined or 
competing goals, action/feedback loops, time constraints, high stakes, multiple 
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players, and organizational goals and norms (Orassanu & Connolly, 1993). 
Applying naturalistic decision making to a situation requires that some—not 
necessarily all—of these contextual features are present (Grossman et al., 2014). 
Additionally, naturalistic decision making relies heavily on experience. That is, 
decision-makers are required to have some amount of knowledge of the decision 
domain (Lipshitz et al., 2001). This facilitates a critical component as decision-
makers engage in a matching process between cues within their existing and 
previous decision environments (Grossman et al., 2014). As this relates to 
resource allocation, I suggest that this reliance on cues further supports the 
relevance of naturalistic decision making to resource allocation decisions as it 
provides the possibility of enhancing allocation decision through the practice of 
training. 
There are four essential characteristics of naturalistic decision making that 
distinguishes it from other decision making frameworks. The first is that 
naturalistic decision making is process-oriented (Lipshitz et al., 2001). This 
means that rather than proposing the appropriate alternative in a choice situation, 
the naturalistic model describes the decision process. Therefore, applying 
naturalistic decision making to resource allocation would focus on identifying the 
type of information focused on to arrive at decisions about what to prioritize. By 
knowing this, attempts can be made to provide this information in order to prime 
more appropriate allocation decisions. The second characteristic is the use of 
situation-action matching decision rules (e.g., “Do A because it is appropriate for 
situation S”; Lipshitz et al., 2001; p. 334). This has an important implication to 
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resource allocation decisions. Explicitly, if we are able to identify appropriate 
matching rules for ideal allocations, this can help to facilitate superior 
performance and help to avoid erroneous allocations. Given that the resource 
allocation process is fundamentally dynamic (Atkinson & Birch, 1978), 
naturalistic decision making may help to guide appropriate task switching as 
called for by the work situation. Third, naturalistic decision making is context-
bound which further supports the value of domain-specific experience (Lipshitz et 
al., 2001). The final characteristic is that naturalistic decision making facilitates 
empirically-based prescriptions (Lipshitz et al., 2001). This means that optimal 
allocation decisions would be based on evidence of previously successful 
allocations. The third and fourth characteristics reinforce the value of expertise or 
prior experience within the decision-domain. This leads to the question of what 
underlining features of experience support naturalistic decision making. 
Cues aiding naturalistic decision making. 
To better appreciate the underlining factors of influence during naturalistic 
decision making, it is helpful to understand a specific type of naturalistic decision 
making model—recognition-primed decision making (RPD; Klein, 1998). RPD 
involves categorizing a situation as similar to other situations in the past and 
finding a course of action by predicting the outcome. RPD includes three 
variations of “if: then” reactions (Klein, 1998). The first variation occurs when the 
situation is clear and the decision-maker has a fair understanding of both the 
stimulus and the outcome. The second and third variations occur when the 
decision maker is uncertain about either the stimulus situation or outcome. In 
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order to decide under uncertain conditions, expert decision-makers often rely on 
cues (Klein, 1998). The reliance on cues in decision making represents a 
simplification method used by decision makings in complex situations (Lant & 
Hewlin, 2002).  
The use of cues to facilitate decision making has been shown to be an 
effective strategy. Based on schema theory, people develop cognitive 
representations of the information they process, which helps provide rules to 
direct behavior (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). Cues may therefore help to increase 
efficiency in complex allocation situations, as they can provide guidelines based 
on previous experience. Further, the use of cues also helps enhance situational 
awareness (Grossman et al., 2014). Situational awareness is knowledge of one’s 
environment; including an understanding of the meaning and status that each 
element presents (Endsley & Garland, 2000). This has some implication to 
resource allocation in situations where multiple elements are competing for one’s 
attention. That is to say, by having adequate awareness of one’s situation, a better 
determination can be made about the meaning and relevance of any “distractors” 
presented. Therefore, less time should be lost on tasks that detract from the 
accomplishment of one’s main goal, as with better situational awareness only 
critical off-tasks will be attended to.  
Related to the discussion of working memory above, working memory is 
responsible for cue-based processing, coordination, and control (Baddeley, 2003; 
Oberauer et al., 2003). Further, working memory capacity also predicts how 
individuals attend to information. Specifically, those with low working memory 
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capacity are more likely to attend to off-task activities (Kane & Engle, 2003). 
Consequently, relying on working memory to facilitate this cue-based processing 
may only further reduce working memory capacity. Therefore, before 
implementing resource allocation cues in an attempt to support better allocation 
decisions, it may be useful to first explore the effectiveness of different types of 
cues in light of differences in working memory capacity. Explicitly, might those 
with low working memory capacity benefit more from a certain type of cue? I 
propose that cues presented from the bottom-up (i.e., task or stimulus level) 
require less cognitive effort for those with low working memory capacity, 
considering that they have less top-down cognitive control than people with high 
working memory capacity (Redick & Engle, 2006).  
 Therefore, I predict that working memory capacity will influence 
sensitivity to the source of cues. To be exact, those with high working memory 
capacity will effectively allocate resources when provided with cues at the level 
of the goal (e.g., feedback on goal progress facilitating self-regulation) or, at the 
level of the goal along with cues on the task (e.g., information on priority of off-
tasks), because they possess the cognitive resources needed to both self-regulate 
and maintain cognitive control (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Conversely, those 
with low working memory capacity will demonstrate more effective performance 
in situations of competing attentional demands when provided with cues at the 
level of the task as the instantaneous nature of these cues will command more 
attention when working memory capacity is low (Kane & Engle, 2003). Further, 
when individuals with low working memory capacity are given both task- and 
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goal-focused cues, the presence of both cues will impair performance as 
processing information from both cues will command more cognitive resources 
which low working memory individuals lack (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). In this 
study, task-related cues should reduce the cognitive demands on low working 
memory individuals by reducing the need to consciously make judgments about 
whether they should switch their attention to the off-task activity. Allocation 
cueing that encourages attending to whether an off-task activity is critical should 
provide help (in comparison to cueing a goal monitoring focus), rather than hurt 
low working memory individuals. Therefore, providing salient or clear 
information on whether a secondary or off-task demand requires attention may 
help those with low working memory capacity allocate their attention 
appropriately. In sum, it is expected that cueing those with high working memory 
at the goal and goal and task levels will result in a) more time on a goal-related 
task and, b) better performance on a goal-related task. Conversely, cueing 
individuals with low working memory capacity at the task level will result in a) 
more time on a goal-related task and b) better performance on a goal-related task. 
See Figure 2 for the full conceptual model of the proposed relationships. 
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Figure 2. Conceptual Model Depicting the Proposed Moderated-Mediated 
Relationship between Cue Type, Working Memory, Time on Task, and 
Performance.  
Rationale 
 The proposed study contributes to the understanding of resource allocation 
performance from a decision making perspective. Naturalistic decision making, 
while mostly applied to emergency contexts (e.g., Carvalho, dos Santos, & Vidal, 
2005), has some promise for more typical decision making contexts (Grossman et 
al., 2014). The resource allocation context is believed to be one such context 
given its dynamism (Atkinson & Birch, 1978). The proposed research applies the 
principles of naturalistic decision making and seeks to determine if working 
memory capacity moderates the relationship between allocation cues and 
performance in the resource allocation context.   
 The results from this study have two primary implications. First, this study 
applies naturalistic decision making to a prototypical work context. While 
naturalistic decision making is believed to be valuable outside of contexts related 
to firefighting, the military, aviation, and medical decision making (Grossman et 
Working Memory Time on 
task 
Cue Type Performance 
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al., 2014), very little research has applied naturalistic decision making to 
prototypical working settings such as office environments. Factors such as greater 
autonomy, technological advancements, and increases in the distributed nature of 
work (Goodwin, Burke, Wildman, & Salas, 2009; Wood, 2011) present a very 
complex environment for resource allocation and, as such, naturalistic decision 
making may provide some value in understanding allocation decisions. This value 
can be enhanced through proper task-related training directed at managing 
multiple demands which leads to the second major contribution of this research. 
 Second, by identifying the differential effects of resource allocation cues 
on resource allocation, targeted work design or training can be implemented to 
take advantage of these effects. That is, if those with low working memory 
capacity show more effective performance when given allocation cues at the task 
level, work or training design could provide targeted interventions to help 
individuals with low working memory to perform in resource allocation contexts. 
For example, this research may suggest that cueing low working memory capacity 
employees to attend to task features may be more effective than a focus on goals 
in situations where task distractions are highly likely. As another practical 
application, training based on the principles of naturalistic decision making can 
take several approaches. One promising training format which facilitates cue 
recognition is situation awareness training (Grossman et al., 2014).  Situational 
awareness refers to the ability to perceive features of the environment and to 
comprehend the meaning of these features (Endsley, 1995). This research will 
help to provide support regarding the types of cues best capable to facilitate this 
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awareness based on working memory differences. In addition to cue recognition 
or situational awareness training, another practical implication that this research 
may provide concerns the provision of resource allocation cues in the work 
environment. If the hypothesis that task-level cues are more effective than goal-
level cues for individuals with low working memory, then attempts to make task-
level cues more salient or clear may also provide some advantages. The 
hypotheses are summarized below. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: There will be a positive relationship between working memory 
capacity and time spent on task such that, participants with higher working 
memory capacity will spend more time on the task (i.e., be less distracted by the 
e-mails). 
Hypothesis II: There will be a positive relationship between time spent on task 
and performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency such that, participants 
with higher working memory capacity will be more accurate and more efficient.  
Hypothesis III: The relationship between cue type and performance (a) accuracy 
and (b) efficiency will be partially mediated by time on primary task. 
Hypothesis IV: Working memory will moderate the effect of cue type on time 
spent on the primary task. Specifically, 
(a) As working memory increases, individuals who are exposed to the goal-
focused cue or both goal- and task-focused cues will spend more time on 
the task than individuals exposed to the task-focused cue.  
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(b) As working memory decreases, individuals exposed to task cues will 
spend more time on the task than individuals exposed to the goal-focused 
cue or both goal- and task-focused cues.    
Hypothesis V: Working memory will moderate the effect of cue type on 
performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency. Specifically, 
(a) As working memory increases, individuals who are exposed to the goal-
focused cue or both goal- and task-focused cues will demonstrate higher 
performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency on the task than 
individuals exposed to the task-focused cue. 
(b) As working memory decreases, individuals exposed to task cues will 
demonstrate higher performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) 
efficiency on the task than individuals exposed to the goal-focused cue or 
both goal- and task-focused cues.    
  





 A one-way independent samples experimental design with four conditions 
was used to examine the hypotheses. Specifically, the independent variable, cue 
type, was manipulated to include four levels: task level cue, goal level cue, both 
task and goal level cues, and no cue. Working memory was measured as an 
individual difference moderator variable. Attention was operationalized as the 
proportion of time spent on the primary task, and was examined as a potential 
mediator of the working memory and cue type effect on performance. The 
dependent variable was performance, which was operationalized in two ways: a) 
accuracy (correct responses) and b) efficiency (time to completion). General 
mental ability, task-specific self-efficacy, goal orientation, conscientiousness, 
experience with the task software (Excel), and baseline performance were 
examined as covariates. 
Participants 
Participants were undergraduates enrolled in Introduction to Psychology 
(PSY 105 & 106) at a large, private Midwestern University. Participants received 
2.5 credits for their participation (.5 for an online pre-measure and 2.0 for the 
experiment). Participants from all demographic background (e.g., gender, race) 
were allowed to participate; however, all participants were at least 18 years old. In 
total, 484 participants completed the pre-measure (part 1); of that number, 235 
also completed the experiment (part 2). Given that participants were required to 
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complete both parts 1 and 2, 235 was the qualified sample size for hypothesis 
testing. After data preparation and screening, the total sample included in study 
analyses was reduced to 166 participants; this is further discussed in the section 
describing the data screening process. Of the participants who were included in 
the analyses, 79.5% self-identified as female and 19.9% as male. The average age 
of participants was 19.72 (SD = 2.48). Regarding racial background, 58.4% of the 
participants reported being Caucasian/White, 19.9% as Hispanic or of Spanish 
origin, 13.9% as Asian/Pacific Islander, 6.6% as Black/African American, and 
.6% as American Indian or Alaska native. In terms of employment status, 53.6% 
of participants reported being not employed, while 41.6% were employed part-
time, and 4.2% had fulltime employment. Finally, regarding years of work 
experience, 25.3% of the sample had 5-10 years of work experience. 
Task Description 
 The experimental task was a procedural knowledge Excel task previously 
used to assess trainer effects (e.g., Towler et al., 2008; see Appendix A). The task 
involved using Microsoft Excel to conduct calculations, formatting, filtering, and 
creating charts using a dataset on the lifestyle choices of college students. The 
task included seven questions that participants were asked to complete. 
Participants were given 15 minutes to complete the task. The primary task was 
scored out of a total of 36 points based on the number of correct responses. 
The lab task also included a distractor activity (see Appendix B), which 
was attending to e-mails. During the task, participants received a series of e-mails 
intended to simulate a work environment whereby a secondary activity competed 
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for the allocation of attention from a primary task. Participants received a total of 
8 e-mails. The e-mails served no task-related purpose and were solely intended to 
distract participants from the experimental task (example e-mail titles included: 
“Discover the meaning and history behind your last name” and “Sign up for 
additional Experiments on Sona Systems”. Participants were told that they were 
free to attend to these e-mails if they wished to do so. The e-mails were selected 
to be attractive enough in nature so as to elicit the attention of participants away 
from the main task. As participants worked on completing the task, e-mails were 
received via a dedicated Microsoft Outlook e-mail account whereby on receipt of 
an e-mail, a visual notification to the lower right hand corner as well as an 
auditory notification by headphone was received. Participants were instructed to 
wear headphones during the task; this was done to increase the likelihood of 
participants noticing the e-mails.  
Study Manipulation 
Independent variable: Cue type was manipulated to include goal, task, 
task and goal, or no cue. The cues were intended to prime participants to engage 
in either top-down (i.e., goal-focused), bottom- up (i.e., task-focused), or both 
types of attention allocation strategies. In other words, participants in the goal cue 
condition were primed to attend the experimental activities based on their goal 
(e.g., goal progress); conversely, participants in the task cue condition were 
primed to attend to activities based on features at the task level (e.g., criticality), 
and finally, participants receiving both task and goal cues were primed to engage 
in both types of allocation strategies. In total, 39 participants were included in 
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goal cue condition, 44 were in the task cue condition, 41 were in the goal and task 
cue condition, and 42 participants were in the control group.  
Participants in the goal cue condition (i.e., top-down attention) were given 
a paragraph describing the importance of top-down thinking. The paragraph (see 
Appendix C) provided an explanation of what top-down processing means, a 
description the value of processing from the top down (i.e., maintaining a focus 
on a goal) and two recommendations for using this strategy when deciding how to 
allocate attention while completing the task (e.g., considering how close one is to 
a goal). Essentially, participants were primed to focus on allocating their attention 
based on an overarching goal. Participants in this condition were also asked to set 
a goal for themselves after reading the instructions. The purpose of setting this 
goal was to give participants a frame of reference for regulating their attention as 
they worked on completing the task. 
Likewise, participants in the task cue condition (i.e., bottom–up attention) 
were given a paragraph describing bottom-up thinking (see Appendix C). The 
paragraph provided an explanation of bottom-up processing, a description of its 
benefit (i.e., attending to critical or urgent information) and two recommendations 
for using this strategy when deciding how to allocate attention while completing 
the task (e.g., quickly scan e-mail title to determine relevance). Participants were 
primed to allocate their attention based on the nature of the e-mails received. 
Participants in the both task and goal cue condition received both paragraphs in 
their instructions.  
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Manipulation check. Each manipulation was followed by a series of 
questions assessing participants’ understanding of the description of the strategies 
and a question about a self-set goal for participants in the goal-focused condition. 
These questions served as the manipulation check (see Appendix C). Twelve 
participants failed the manipulation check by failing to provide the correct 
responses. These participants were excluded from the analyses. 
Procedure 
 Participants completed a two-step process as part of their participation in 
the study. First, using Sona System, participants sign up to participate in the 
study. They were given a description of the research and the requirements for the 
two-part nature of the study. Participants then had the option to complete the first 
online portion (after reviewing the informed consent; Appendix D) which 
included the pre-test measures of: a) conscientiousness, b) goal orientation, c) 
experience with Microsoft Office platforms (i.e., Word, PowerPoint) within 
which was embedded a measure of experience with Excel, and d) the 
demographic measure (Appendix E). Participants received half a credit (.5) for 
completing these measures. In order to create a unique identifier to link data from 
the online pre-test to the second portion (i.e., lab data), participants were 
instructed to create a unique password that they were required to take with them 
to the lab if they so desired to participate in the second portion of the study. 
Participants then had the option of signing up for the lab session—participation in 
the lab session was not required, therefore, there was some attrition between the 
first and second components of the study.  
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Prior to the participants’ arrival to the lab for the second portion of the 
study a random condition assignment software was used to create a series of 
participant ID numbers based on the four experimental conditions. Numbers were 
then assigned to participants chronologically (e.g., 0001A, 0002C, 0003A, 0004D, 
0004B). On their arrival to the lab, participants were asked to review an informed 
consent document (Appendix F). To ensure that participants had a clear 
understanding of the general purpose of the study, and the benefits and risks 
associated with participation, participants were asked three general questions 
based on information presented on the informed consent. Participants who failed 
to respond correctly were redirected to the informed consent before signing. Once 
signed, participants were then directed to the Qualtrics survey which housed the 
measures to be completed during the lab session. This survey had links to the 
working memory and general mental ability measures. Before accessing the 
survey, participants were required to submit the password that they created at the 
end of the pre-lab measures. Next, participants were given their unique participant 
ID number to enter at the beginning of the working memory and general mental 
ability measures. They were also required to enter this number at the end of the 
Qualtrics survey. Therefore, all measures could be linked using this participant ID 
that also allowed easy tracking of condition assignment. 
In the lab, participants first completed a) an online working memory test, 
and b) a timed general mental ability test. Following this, participants completed a 
15-minute training to become acquainted with the Excel task (Towler et al., 
2008). The training was facilitated by a pedagogical agent-led video created for 
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the task. After watching the video, participants completed a brief recall measure 
to assess their understanding of the training material; this measure served as a 
measure of baseline performance (see Appendix G). Next, participants read the 
instructions for the tasks. Instructions varied based on the study manipulation and 
was followed by the manipulation check (see Appendix C). Next, participants 
completed a task-specific self-efficacy measure (see Appendix H). Finally, they 
began the performance task (Towler et al.).  
Participants were given 15 minutes to complete the task. This is less than 
the 25 minutes typically given to complete this task in prior studies (e.g., Mann, 
Mitchell, Brown, & Towler, 2013; Mitchell, Brown, Mann, & Towler, 2014). 
Participants were given this reduced time limit to make the task more challenging. 
During the task, eight e-mails were sent to participants from a dedicated Gmail 
account. E-mails were sent by the research assistant every 1.5 minute starting 1 
minute into the task. The e-mails were sent to all participants in the same order. 
Participants received these e-mails to a Microsoft Outlook account configured to 
the machine they were working on. Microsoft Outlook allowed e-mails to “pop 
up” at the lower right hand corner of the screen providing both a visual and 
auditory notification. While working on the computer and switching between the 
task and e-mails, the time tracking software, ManicTime, ran in the background to 
track participants’ attention between the Microsoft Excel and Outlook 
applications. The program tracked time based on application opened, mouse 
clicks, and keyboard use.  
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Participants were told when they had 5 minutes remaining on the task and 
were instructed to stop after 15 minutes. For participants who completed the task 
before 15 minutes, the time taken to complete the task was recorded. Once 
completed, participants were instructed to save their working file and directed to 
the Qualtrics to read the study debrief (see Appendix I). 
Measures 
 Moderator: Working memory was measured using the Operational span 
(O-Span) task developed by Bryan Edwards and Ana Franco-Watkins. This task is 
similar to the one developed by the Engle laboratory for use with the E-prime 
software (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). O-span is a test of working 
memory capacity that assesses the associated processing and storage of 
information (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Turner & Engle, 
1989). The O-span correlates with other measures of working memory capacity 
(Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002). This measure was 
convenient as it facilitated accessible online testing via a URL through the 
Franco-Watkins lab.  This test consisted of sets of mathematical problems (e.g., 
8/4 + 3 =7?) coupled with letter strings. First, participants practiced each task, and 
then they practiced solving the mathematical problems while storing the letters to 
memory. In total, there are 75 math/letter pairs; 12 sets were used in this task. A 
working memory score was determined based on the total number of correctly 
recalled letters in the correct position while maintaining accuracy (85% or 
greater) on the mathematical problems. The O-span adapted to each participant's 
time to solve the mathematical problems presented. This measure lasted for 
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approximately 10-15 minutes (self-paced). Appendix J contains screenshots of the 
working memory test. Participants could receive scores ranging from 0-50 points 
on the working memory measure. On average, participants had a working 
memory score of 34.97 (SD = 9.17). 
  Control variables. To help to control the influence of individual 
differences known to have an effect of performance, data was collected on general 
mental ability (GMA), conscientiousness, goal orientation, task self-efficacy, and 
prior experience with Microsoft Excel. To assess GMA, participants completed 
the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT-R) in which they completed as many of 50 
items possible in 8 minutes. Past research has found test-retest reliability of .82-
.94 and alternate-forms reliability coefficients of .73-.95 (Geisinger, 2001). In 
relation to validity, the test demonstrated predictive validation across jobs with 
values of .22-.67 and correlates with the WAIS Full Scale IQ and the General 
Aptitude Test Battery's "Aptitude G" (r = .70-.92; Geisinger, 2001). On average, 
participants had a general mental ability score of 23.55 (SD = 3.28), out of a 
potential range of 0-50. 
Within the domain of personality, conscientiousness has generally shown 
the most promise as a predictor of job performance (r = .25, Barrick & Mount, 
1991; r = .31, Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Conscientiousness was measured using 
the conscientiousness sub-scale from the International Personality Item Pool 
(IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006; Appendix K). The IPIP’s conscientious subscale 
reports coefficient alphas ranging from .71-.85. The scale also correlates with the 
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NEO Personality Inventory (r = .60 - .76; Goldberg et al., 2006).  In this study, 
data collected with the IPIP conscientiousness scale had a coefficient alpha of .86. 
Data were also collected on goal orientation given its observed effect in 
previous resource allocation research (Schmidt et al., 2009). Goal orientation was 
measured using a 13-item instrument on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (VandeWalle, Cron, & Slocum, 2001; 
Appendix L). The instrument also showed high internal consistency in this study 
with acceptable coefficient alphas for learning (.77), avoid (.76), and prove goal 
orientation (.76), respectively. Task-specific self-efficacy, which has a moderate 
to strong relationship with self-regulated learning, was also measured as a control 
variable (Sitzmann & Ely, 2011). Task-specific self-efficacy was measured using 
an adapted scale from prior research which contains 4 items assessing confidence 
in the ability to complete the task (De Guinea & Webster, 2011; Appendix H). 
Sample item includes: “I feel confident that I can carry out the Excel task”. The 
measure shows good reliability (α = .90; De Guinea & Webster, 2011). Scale 
items were assessed using a 1-100 response scale (0 = no confidence; 100 = 
completely confident) to be consistent with recommendations from Bandura 
(2006). In the current study, the scale demonstrated very high internal consistency 
(α = .98). 
Baseline performance was assessed using a 13-item recall test often used 
with the task in previous research. The test was given after the 15-minute training 
video was viewed by the participants and was objectively scored based on an 
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answer sheet. On average, participants had a pretest score of 8.04 (SD = 2.28).  
The recall test can be found in Appendix G. 
Experience with Excel was also accessed by asking participants how 
frequently they use Microsoft Excel (Towler et al., 2008). This measure was 
included in the pre-test survey with questions about the frequency of use of other 
Microsoft products so as to reduce the likelihood of participants predicting the 
task for the study before coming to the lab (Appendix M). Thirty-two percent of 
the participants reported having no experience using Microsoft Excel. 
Mediator: Proportion of time spent on task was used as a proxy for 
attention. Time was recorded in seconds using the ManicTime software. This 
software automatically monitors and records computer usage by tracking time 
spent, in seconds, using different applications, working on documents, and 
visiting various websites. The data is date- and time-stamped and stored to the 
local machine (not cloud-based) which facilitates offline tracking (see Appendix 
N for a screen shot of the data logged using ManicTime). This program was 
selected instead of a keyboard logger—which tracks key presses or mouse 
movement—as it is assumed that participants may be attending to the Excel file or 
e-mails by looking at the screen without interacting with the keyboard for a 
duration of seconds. At the same time, ManicTime does not distinguish between 
cases in which participants simply have a file or e-mail open but are not actively 
attending to the information (e.g., not looking at the screen, reading). As such, 
research assistants were instructed to monitor participants to make a note of 
participants who appear inattentive to the task. No participant was reported as 
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displaying behavior indicating  disengagement during the task (e.g., staring off 
into space for a significant period of time).  
Given the preciseness (i.e., time in seconds) of the time measurement and 
the presence of minor variations in task length, attention was operationalized as 
the proportion of time spent on task. Proportion was calculated as time on task 
divided by total time (time on task plus e-mail). See Table 1 for means and 
standard deviations for proportion of time spent on task by study condition.  
Dependent variable: Performance outcome was determined in two 
ways: a) accuracy and b) efficiency. Accuracy was calculated based on correct 
responses to each item. The correct responses were indicated on an answer sheet 
prepared for the task (Towler et al., 2008). Accuracy was calculated as an 
aggregate of scores from the primary task (36 points).  
Efficiency was determined based on the amount of time taken to complete 
the task. Participants who completed the task, before the allotted 15 minutes, 
received efficiency points based on the number of seconds they had remaining at 
the time of task completion. For example, a participant who completed the task in 
10 minutes received 300 efficiency points while a participant who completed the 
task in 14 minutes received 60 points for efficiency. That is, participants 
completing the task in 10 minutes had 5 minutes remaining (i.e., 300 seconds) and 
a participant completing the task in 14 minutes had 1 minute remaining (i.e., 60 
seconds). Participants who failed to complete the task received an efficiency score 
of 0. See Table 1 for means and standard deviation of efficiency and accuracy by 
study condition. 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Outcome Variables by Study Condition 
 
  Goal Task Both Control Total 
N 39 44 41 42 166 
Proportion of time on task 0.84 (.36) 0.95 (.20) 0.85 (.35) 0.90 (.29) 0.89 (.30) 
Accuracy 11.26 (6.00) 12.82 (9.19) 12.46 (9.79) 10.50 (8.92) 11.78 (8.78) 
Efficiency 3.41 (13.88) 17.10 (50.62) 12.15 (42.98) 20.57 (59.66) 13.54 (45.67) 
Note: Values in the cells are presented as means followed by the standard deviation in parentheses.  
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PART III 
Results & Analyses 
Before hypothesis testing, data were screened for violations of statistical 
assumptions. The data preparation and screening process is detailed below. 
Data Preparation and Screening 
In total, data were collected from 235 participants; however, only 166 
participants were included in the analyses. Twelve participants failed the 
manipulation check and were removed from the final sample and 2 participants 
were removed due to missing records on the experimental log (e.g., time on task 
vs. email, engagement). Data from 55 participants were excluded from the 
analyses as a result of a failure to match the unique password supplied for both 
the pre-lab and lab portions of the study. Specifically, some participants either 
provided the same password as another participant (e.g., non-unique password 
such as ‘password123’) making it difficult to identify to whom data belonged, or 
they did not provide a password that could be found in the pre-lab dataset. This 
resulted in missing data on all covariates. A series of independent samples t-tests 
was performed comparing the mean scores of the included and excluded 
participants on the key study variables. There were no significant differences for 
the scores on working memory (t [219] = .25, ns), accuracy (t [219] = .73, ns), nor 
efficiency (t [219] = .17, ns) between participants included and excluded from the 
analyses. However, there was a significant difference for proportion of time on 
task between the included (M = .88, SD = .30) and excluded participants (M = .99, 
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SD =0.02; t [219] = -2.64, p < .01). Participants excluded from the sample spent a 
greater proportion of time on the task than those included in the sample. However, 
the decision to exclude participants without scores on all covariates was 
maintained. This decision was made because the covariates were significant 
predictors in the regression models and because the sample size without the 55 
cases with missing data was adequate for detecting a medium-sized effect. 
A post-hoc power analysis was conducted using G*Power version 3.0.10. 
Power was calculated for the regression analysis with the largest number of 
predictors (14, including control variables); the results indicated that there was 
sufficient power (i.e., .88) to detect a medium-sized effect (.15) at α =.05 with the 
sample size of 161
1
 (Cohen, 1992; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
Normality assumptions. To examine normality assumptions, preliminary 
analyses were conducted to assess skewness and kurtosis. All main study 
variables, including working memory capacity, proportion of time on task, task 
efficiency, and accuracy, were examined. To assess normality, skewness and 
kurtosis values were divided by their standard errors. Resulting values above 1.96 
indicated the presence of skewness and kurtosis within the data (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Using this metric, it was discovered that both outcomes, the 
mediating, and moderating variables were non-normal in distribution.  As a result, 
these variables were transformed prior to hypotheses testing.  
Specifically, the proposed mediating variable, proportion of time on task, 
was significantly left-skewed and was raised to the power of 4 to reduce skewness 
                                                          
1
 Some cases were deleted during the analyses due to missing data on one covariate (e.g., GMA, 
conscientiousness).  
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and kurtosis. The transformation reduced the skewness of the distribution but the 
variable remained non-normally distributed, most likely because there was a 
highly restricted range. Working memory was also transformed by raising the 
variable to the power of 2; this transformation successfully normalized the 
distribution of working memory. Additionally, both dependent variables 
(accuracy and efficiency) were also transformed. Accuracy was slightly right-
skewed and was converted using a square root transformation. This 
transformation successfully normalized the distribution of accuracy. Efficiency 
was re-expressed using the reciprocal root of the original values. Before 
conducting this transformation, a value of 1 was added to all variables as 
participants who did not complete the task had an efficiency score of 0. This 
transformation reduced the skewness and kurtosis of this variable but did not 
result in a normal distribution as efficiency was also highly restricted in range. All 
regression analyses were conducted using the transformed values. Table 2 reports 
the mean and standard deviations for all study variables including transformed 
variables. 
Regression assumptions. To ensure that assumptions of regression were 
met, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and influential observations were 
examined using the transformed variables. To assess multicollinearity two 
preliminary linear regression models were run predicting each outcome variable 
(i.e., accuracy and efficiency). Tolerance and Index of Variance Inflation (VIF) 
values were examined to assess the presence of multicollinearity. However, all 
values were within normal range (O’Brien, 2007). 
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To assess heteroscedasticity, residuals were plotted against predicted 
scores and plots were visually inspected to confirm homogeneity of variance. The 
regression model including task accuracy as the outcome demonstrated no cause 
for concern regarding homogeneity of variance. However, the linear model 
predicting task efficiency suggested a violation of the assumption of 
homoscedasticity. As a result, a formal test of heteroscedasticity was conducted. 
The Breusch-Pagan test, which examines whether variance in the residuals is 
predicted by the independent variables, was conducted (Breusch & Pagan, 1979; 
Hayes & Cai, 2007). This test confirmed homogeneity of variance. 
Finally, the Cook’s distance was used to identify influential observations. 
All values were examined to identify any Cook’s distance scores greater that 4/(n-
k-1) (Chatterjee & Hadi, 1988). To account for any differences in the analyses 
resulting from these influential observations, analyses were conducted both with 
and without these observations. Where influential observations were identified, 
this will be reported for the relevant analysis in the result section. 
Analytical Approach 
Hypotheses for this study were tested using regression analyses. When 
applicable, moderated-mediation analysis was used to test specific hypotheses 
(Hayes, 2013a). In the case of this study, time spent on the primary task was 
expected to mediate or explain the effect of cue type on performance. Working 
memory was also expected to moderate the direct effect of cue type on 
performance as well as the effect of cue type on time spent on task. This effect 
was tested using the PROCESS macro developed by Hayes’ (2013b), specifically 
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using Hayes’s (2013b) Model 8. The approach uses an ordinary least square path 
analytic approach with bootstrap and Monte Carlo confidence intervals. This 
approach is considered superior to the combination of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
step approach to mediational analyses with the Sobel test (Hayes, 2015; Preacher 
& Hayes, 2004). Using this PROCESS model, mediation is determined and 
communicated using the indirect effects rather than the a and b coefficients as is 
traditionally done with the Baron and Kenny method (Preacher & Kelley, 2011).  
While moderated mediation analysis is widely used in the social sciences, 
it is typically used to examine continuous independent variables. In this study, the 
independent variable (cue type) was categorical and had 4 levels (task cue, goal 
cue, both task and goal cues, and no cue); the additional predictors were 
continuous. Recently, a treatment for categorical independent variables has been 
proposed using the PROCESS macro for testing mediation analyses (Hayes & 
Preacher, 2014). This approach is thought to be superior to other approaches 
which require the researcher to dichotomize independent variables with more than 
two levels, collapse groups, or use continuous manipulations checks as substitutes 
for independent variables (e.g., Forgas, 2011; Ronay, Greenaway, Anicich, & 
Galinsky, 2012).  
This approach involves dummy coding the categorical independent 
variables and repeating the analyses for each dummy coded variable; in the case 
of this study, 2 analyses were conducted. When the independent variable is 
categorical, parameter estimates are needed to represent the indirect effect at each 
level of the independent variable. These estimates represent relative effects 
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(Hayes & Preacher, 2014). In other words, the effects reported for each level of 
the categorical independent variable should be interpreted as relative to referent 
dummy-coded group. 
 To test the overall model in this study, the four cue conditions were 
represented using 3 dummy-coded variables. The task cue group was used as the 
referent group and participants in this condition were coded as 0 for all three 
dummy variables.  D1 represented the goal cue/not goal cue distinction. D2 
represented the goal and task cue/not goal and task cue distinction, and D3 
represented the control/not control distinction. The PROCESS macro was 
executed 2 times for each outcome variable to determine the indirect effects and 
conditional effects of working memory for each level of cue type. With each test, 
the dummy code with the distinction of interest (e.g., goal cue versus non goal cue 
distinction) was entered as the predictor; however, so that the comparison was the 
referent group (i.e., task cue), the other dummy codes were included as covariates 
in the same model. For example, when testing the effect of goal cue as the 
independent variable, the dummy codes for both task and goal cues and the 
control group were entered in the model as covariates. In the tables displaying 
results, the cue types are indicated as D1, D2, and D3, as described above.   
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations of Study Variables  
 
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Conscientiousness 3.69 0.46 (.86) 
         
2. GO Learning 5.09 1.10 .23** (.77) 
        
3. GO Prove 4.20 1.33 .18* .07 (.76) 
       
4. GO Avoid 4.71 1.09 -.07 -.39** .31** (.76) 
      
5. Task Efficacy 58.76 25.22 .10 .16* .09 -.14 (.98) 
     
6. GMA 23.55 3.28 -.07 .09 -.04 .01 .18* -- 
    
7. Excel Frequency 2.82 1.60 .05 .11 -.06 -.11 .25** .05 -- 
   
8. Working Memory Score 34.97 9.17 -.15 .02 .06 .03 .21** .41** .11 -- 
  
9. Working Memory ScoreT 
           
1306 591 -.14 .05 .05 .01 .23** .42** .13 .98** -- 
 
10. Pretest 8.04 2.28 -.07 .12 -.12 -.21** .39** .37** .21** .28** .27** -- 
11. Task Time 891 182 .10 .13 -.08 -.05 .02 -.10 -.04 -.16* -.13 -.10 
12. E-mail Time 9.44 18.89 -.01 .03 .17* -.07 .07 -.04 .09 -.09 -.10 -.04 
13. Task Time(Proportion) 0.88 0.30 -.01 .00 -.05 -.01 -.10 .04 -.03 .01 .03 .08 
14. Task Time(Proportion)T 0.96 0.08 .01 -.03 -.17* .06 -.07 .03 -.09 .09 .10 .04 
15. Task Efficiency 13.54 45.67 .09 -.01 .07 .07 .21** .21** .20* .07 .06 .13 
16. Task EfficiencyT 2.12 3.18 .12 -.01 .09 .09 .20** .20** .20* .06 .05 .13 
17. Task Accuracy 11.78 8.78 .21** .20* -.13 -.26** .22** .34** .13 .10 .13 .28** 
18. Task AccuracyT 3.32 1.32 .22** .19* -.12 -.25** .24** .33** .15 .07 .10 .29** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). GO = goal orientation. Propor = proportion. T = transformed variable. 
Time is reported in seconds. N = 166 for all study variables with the exception of GMA (N = 163), conscientiousness, learning, prove and avoid goal orientation, task efficacy and 
Excel frequency (N = 165). 
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Table 2  





11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
11. Task Time -- 
       12. E-mail Time -0.14 -- 
      13. Task Time(Proportion) 0.1 -0.15 -- 
     14. Task Time(Proportion)T .16* -.99** .16*     -- 
 
   15. Task Efficiency -.26** 0.01 -.18* -0.01 -- 
   16. Task EfficiencyT -.26** 0.02 -0.15 -0.03 .96**  -- 
  17. Task Accuracy 0.04 0.06 -0.1 -0.05 0.12 0.07 -- 
 18. Task AccuracyT 0.06 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0.13 0.1  .98**        -- 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). GO = goal orientation. Propor = proportion.  
T = transformed variable. Time is reported in seconds. N = 166 for all study variables with the exception of GMA (N = 163), conscientiousness, learning, prove and avoid goal 
orientation, task efficacy and Excel frequency (N = 165). 
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Hypothesis I 
The first hypothesis predicted that there would be a positive relationship 
between working memory and time spent on task such that participants with 
higher working memory capacity would spend more time on the task (i.e., be less 
distracted by the e-mails). To test this hypothesis, a hierarchical regression model 
was run with transformed proportion of time on task as the dependent variable, a 
control variable related to transformed proportion of time on task (i.e., GO prove) 
entered as a first step, and transformed working memory capacity entered in the 
second step. The overall model was significant (F [2, 162] = 3.34, p = .04), but 
results indicated no support for Hypothesis I. Specifically, the relationship 
between transformed working memory capacity and transformed proportion of 
time on task was nonsignificant (β = .10, p = .19, 95% CI [.00, .00]).  
An examination of regression assumptions indicated the presence of 10 
influential observations for this analysis. The analysis was conducted a second 
time without the influential observations. While the magnitude of the effect of the 
control variable (i.e., GO prove) was reduced in the analysis without influential 
observations, the effect of working memory did not change substantially. Table 3 
presents the results of the regression analyses with and without influential 
observations. 
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Table 3  
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Working Memory as a Predictor of Proportion of Time on Task 
(Hypothesis I)  
With Influential Observations 
  Step 1    Step 2  
Step b SE β t R2 F  b SE β t R2 F 
Step 1: Control Variable     .03 4.95
*
      .04 3.34
*
 
   Intercept 1.00 .02  50.92
*
          
   GO Prove  -.01 .00 -.17 -2.23
*
    -.10 .00 -.18 -2.30
*
   
Step 2: Predictor              
    Intercept        .99 .02  42.78
*
   
    Working Memory
T
        1.32 .00 .10   1.31   
 
Without Influential Observations 
  Step 1    Step 2  
Step b SE β t R2 F     b SE β t R2 F 
Step 1: Control Variable     .03 5.08
*




   Intercept 1.01 .02  47.89
*
          
    GO Prove  -.01 .01 -.18 -2.25
*
    -.01 .01 -.18 -2.32
*
   
Step 2: Predictor              
    Intercept        .99 .02  40.32
*
   
    Working Memory
T
        1.38 .00 .10 1.29   
**
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
* 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
T
 = transformed variable.  N = 165 with influential observations. N = 155 without 
influential observations. 
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Hypothesis II 
Hypothesis II predicted a positive relationship between time spent on task 
and performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency. That is, participants 
who spent more time on the task, relative to time on e-mails, would more 
accurately and quickly complete the task. Hypothesis IIa was tested with a 
hierarchical regression model in which transformed accuracy was the dependent 
variable. Step 1 included covariates related to the outcome (i.e., 
conscientiousness, learning and avoid goal orientation, task efficacy, and GMA), 
and step 2 included transformed proportion of time on task. The overall model 
was significant, (F [6, 154] = 7.53, p < .0.01), but results indicated no support for 
Hypothesis IIa. Specifically, the relationship between transformed proportion of 
time on task and transformed accuracy was nonsignificant (β = -.04, p = .61, 95% 
CI [-3.00, 1.74]).   
An examination of regression assumptions indicated the presence of 6 
influential observations for this analysis. The analysis was conducted a second 
time without the influential observations. The effect of proportion of time on task 
did not change substantially. Table 4 presents the results of the regression 
analyses with and without influential observations.  
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Table 4 
Results of the Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Proportion of Time on Task as a Predictor of Task Accuracy 
(Hypothesis IIa) 
With Influential Observations 
  Step 1    Step 2  
Step b SE β t R2 F  b SE β t R2 F 
Step 1: Control Variables     .23 9.02
**
      .23 7.53
**
 
   Intercept -.99 1.91     -.83          
   Conscientiousness .57 .21 .20 2.77
**
    .57 .21 .20 2.78
**
   
   GO Avoid -.26 .09 -.21 -2.75
**
    -.25 .09 -.21 -2.72
**
   
   GO Learn -.00 .09 -.00 -.02    -.00 .10 -.00 -.03   
   Task Efficacy .01 .00 .12 1.62    .01 .00 .12 1.58   
   GMA .13 .03 .32 4.45
**
    .13 .03 .33 4.46
**
   
Step 2: Predictor              
    Intercept        -.41 1.63  -.25   
    Proportion of Time on Task
T
        -.62 1.20 -.04 -.52   
Without Influential Observations 
  Step 1    Step 2  
Step b  SE β t R2      F      b SE β t  R2       F 
Step 1: Control Variables     .22  8.19
**
      .23 7.00
**
 
   Intercept -1.64 1.17   -1.40          
   Conscientiousness .60 .21 .22 2.81
**
    .62 .22 .22 2.86
**
   
   GO Avoid -.24 .10 -.19 -2.40
**
    -.23 .10 -.19 -2.39
*
   
   GO Learn -.00 .10 -.00 -.04    -.01 .10 -.01  -.06   
   Task Efficacy .01 .00 .13 1.66    .01 .00 .12 1.63   
   GMA .13 .03 .32 4.30
**
    .14 .03 .33  4.35
**
   
Step 2: Predictor              
    Intercept        -.91 1.65  -.55   
    Proportion of Time on Task
T
        -1.34 1.32 -.07 -1.01   
**
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
* 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
T
 = transformed variable.   N = 161 with influential observations. N = 155 without 
influential observations. 
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Hypothesis IIb predicted a positive relationship between proportion of 
time on task and task efficiency. Hypothesis IIb was tested using a linear 
regression model in which transformed task efficiency was the dependent 
variable. Step 1 included covariates related to the outcome (i.e., task efficacy, 
GMA, and frequency of Microsoft Excel use) and step 2 included transformed 
proportion of time on task. Results are reported in Table 5. The overall model was 
significant, (F [3, 157] = 4.14, p < .0.01), but results indicated no support for 
Hypothesis IIb. Specifically, the relationship between transformed proportion of 
time on task and transformed efficiency was not significant (β = -.01, p = .90, 
95% CI [-6.67. 5.87]).  There were no influential observations detected in this 
analysis. 
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Table 5 
Results of the Hierarchical Regression Analysis of Proportion of Time on Task as a Predictor of Task Efficiency 
(Hypothesis IIb) 
  Step 1    Step 2  
Step b SE β t R2 F  b SE β t R2 F 
Step 1: Control Variables     .10 5.55
**
      .10 4.14
**
 
   Intercept -3.84 1.82  -2.12
*
          
   Task Efficacy .02 .01 .14   1.73    .02 .01 .14  1.72   
   GMA .17 .08 .18 2.27
*
    .17 .08 .18 2.27
*
   
   Excel Frequency .32 .16 .16 2.01
*
    .32 .16 .16 1.99
*
   
Step 2: Predictor              
Intercept        -3.47 3.54    -.98   
    Proportion of Time on Task
T
        -.39 3.18 -.01    -.12   
**
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
* 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
T
 = transformed variable. N = 161. 
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Hypotheses III, IV, and V 
 Hypothesis III predicted that the relationship between cue type and 
performance (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency would be mediated by proportion of 
time on task. Hypothesis IV predicted that working memory would moderate the 
effect of cue type on time spent on the primary task. Specifically, as working 
memory increases, individuals who are exposed to the goal-focused cue or the 
goal- and task-focused cues were expected to spend more time on the task than 
individuals exposed to the task-focused cue. As working memory decreases, 
individuals exposed to task cues were expected to spend more time on the task 
than individuals exposed to the goal- and task-focused cues.  
Finally, Hypothesis V predicted that working memory would moderate the 
effect of cue type on performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency (i.e., 
direct/path c’ effect). Explicitly, as working memory increases, individuals 
exposed to the goal-focused cue or the goal- and task-focused cues were expected 
to demonstrate higher performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency on 
the task than individuals exposed to the task-focused cue. As working memory 
decreases, individuals exposed to task cues were expected to demonstrate higher 
performance in terms of (a) accuracy and (b) efficiency on the task than 
individuals exposed to the goal- and task-focused cues. Hypotheses III-V were 
examined using Model 8 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013a; 2013b). First the 
overall model results are presented followed by the specific coefficients that 
examine each hypothesis. Results for task accuracy are discussed first, followed 
by the results for task efficiency. 
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Overall model results for task accuracy. The overall results of the 
moderated-mediated analyses, with and without 4 influential observations, for 
task accuracy are summarized in Table 6
2
. Covariates observed as having an 
effect on transformed accuracy (i.e., conscientiousness, learning and avoid goal 
orientation, general mental ability, pre-test, and task efficacy) were included in 
the model. For the analysis predicting transformed task accuracy, the overall 
model statistics for the path predicting transformed proportion of time on task 
were nonsignificant (F [13, 147] = .42, ns). However, the overall model 
predicting transformed accuracy was significant [F [14, 146] = 3.50, p < .01] 
                                                          
2
 Indirect and conditional direct effects for the model tested without influential observations are 
not reported as these effects did not change substantially. 
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Table 6  
Results of the Moderated-Mediated Analyses with Accuracy as the Outcome: 
Model Summary and Coefficients  













































Significant at the 0.01 level. 
* 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
T
 = transformed variable.  
WM = working memory.  N = 161. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was 
coded as the referent group.  D1 = goal cue; D2 = both task and goal cues; D3 = control.  
b = unstandardized regression coefficient. Boot strap sample size = 10,000.   
Outcome: Proportion of 
Time on Task
T











 .04 .42  
Intercept .93* .09     
Conscientiousness .01 .01     
GO Learn -.00 .01     
GO Avoid .00 .01     
GMA -.00 .00     
Pre-test .00 .00     
Task Efficacy -.00 .00     
Predictors       
D1  .00 .02     
D2 -.01 .02     
D3 -.01 .02     
WM
T
 .00 .00     
D1 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
D2 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
D3 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
Outcome: Accuracy
T










  .25 3.50
**
   
Intercept -.75 1.74     
Conscientiousness .57* .22     
GO Learn -.01 .01     
GO Avoid -.23* .01     
GMA .13 .03     
Pre-test .07 .05     
Task Efficacy .00 .00     
Predictors       
D1 .07 .28     
D2 -.19 .28     
D3 -.22 .27     
WM
T
 -.00 .00     
D1 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
D2 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
D3 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
Proportion of Time on Task
T
 -.81 1.23     
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Table 6  
Results of the Moderated-Mediated Analyses with Accuracy as the Outcome: 
Model Summary and Coefficients, continued 













































Significant at the 0.01 level. 
* 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
T
 = transformed variable.                 
WM = working memory. N = 157. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was 
coded as the referent group.  D1 = goal cue; D2 = both task and goal cues; D3 = control. b = 
unstandardized regression coefficient. Boot strap sample size = 10,000. 
Outcome: Proportion of 
Time on Task
T











 .04 .41  
Intercept .95* .09     
Conscientiousness .01 .01     
GO Learn -.00 .01     
GO Avoid .00 .01     
GMA -.00 .00     
Pre-test .00 .00     
Task Efficacy -.00 .00     
Predictors       
D1 .00 .02     
D2 -.01 .02     
D3 -.01 .02     
WM
T
 .00 .00     
D1 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
D2 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
D3 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
Outcome: Accuracy
T












   
Intercept -.67 1.74     
Conscientiousness .56* .221     
GO Learn -.05 .10     
GO Avoid -.22* .10     
GMA .13 .03     
Pre-test .05 .05     
Task Efficacy .01 .00     
Predictors       
D1 .13 .27     
D2 -.19 .27     
D3 -.41 .27     
WM
T
 -.00 .00     
D1 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
D2 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
D3 * WM
T
 -.00 .00     
Proportion of Time on Task
T
 -.61 1.20     
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Hypothesis IIIa predicted that the relationship between cue type and 
accuracy would be mediated by proportion of time on task. The first analyses 
examined the indirect effect of cue on transformed accuracy through proportion of 
time spent on task. Analyses controlled for conscientiousness, learning and avoid 
goal orientation, general mental ability, pre-test, and task efficacy. Table 7 
displays the unstandardized regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), and 
bootstrapped results for the indirect effects. There was no significant difference 
between the task cue and the goal (b = -.00) nor between task cue and both task 
and goal cues (b = .00) conditions in predicting transformed accuracy through 
transformed time spent on task. Bootstrap results with a bootstrapped 95% CI 
around the indirect effect included zero (goal cue [.00, .00], both task and goal 
cues [-.00, .00]). Therefore, Hypothesis IIIa was not supported.  
 
Table 7 
Relative Indirect Effect of Task Cue Type on Task Accuracy
T
 through Proportion 
of Time
T
 on Task 
   Goal Cue  Both Task and Goal Cues 
Effect    .0000   .0000 
SE (Boot)   .0000   .0001 
BootLLCI   .0000                       -.0002 
BootULCI   .0001   .0000 
Note: Cue type was dummy coded. N = 161. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task 
cue was coded as the referent group.  Effects are relative to the task cue. Bootstrap sample size  
= 10,000. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. Effects are unstandardized 
coefficient estimates.
 T
 = transformed variable.
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Hypothesis IV predicted that working memory would moderate the effect 
of cue type on time spent on the primary task. Specifically, as working memory 
increases, individuals who are exposed to the goal-focused cue or the goal- and 
task-focused cues were expected to spend more time on the task than individuals 
exposed to the task-focused cue. As working memory decreases, individuals 
exposed to task cues were expected to spend more time on the task than 
individuals exposed to the goal- and task-focused cues. Results from the overall 
moderated-mediated model predicting transformed task accuracy
3
 (Table 6) 
indicated no significant moderated effect of transformed working memory on the 
cue type and transformed proportion of time on task relationship for neither goal 
cue as compared to the task cue (b = .00) nor both task and goal cues as compared 
to the task cue (b = .00) in the model predicting transformed task accuracy. 
Results for the analyses testing whether transformed working memory 
moderated the relationship between cue type and transformed accuracy 
(Hypothesis Va) are presented in Table 8. Results indicated that the conditional 
direct effects of working memory were nonsignificant at 1 standard deviation 
below the mean on transformed working memory (goal cue, b = .00, ns; both task 
and goal cues, b = -.47, ns), at the mean (goal cue, b = .08; both task and goal 
cues, b = -.19, ns), and 1 standard deviation above the mean (goal cue, b = .15, ns; 
both task and goal cues, b = .09, ns). These results indicate that there were no 
differences between the conditional direct effects for participants in the task cue 
condition compared to those in the goal and both task and goal cues conditions at 
                                                          
3
 These results are independent of type of performance and are therefore identical in both 
models. 
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different levels of working memory. Therefore, Hypothesis Va was not supported.  
Given no significant effects observed for the independent, proposed moderating, 
or proposed mediating variables in this analysis, this model was not explored 
further.
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Table 8 
Conditional Direct Effect of Working Memory
T




Goal Cue Both Task and Goal Cues 
WM Level 
Conditional 
Direct Effects SE t LLCI ULCI 
Conditional               
Direct Effects SE t LLCI ULCI 
-1SD .00 .37 .01 -.74 .74 -.47 .41 - 1.15 -1.29 .34 
Mean .08 .28 .78 -.47 .62 -.19 .28    -.69 -.74  .36 
+1SD .15 .39 .39 -.62 .92   .09 .37     .24 -.65  .83 
Note:  Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was coded as the referent group.  Levels for working memory are the mean and 
plus/minus one SD from mean. N = 161. Direct effects are unstandardized coefficient estimates.  Bootstrap sample size = 10,000.  
CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 
T
 = transformed variable. 
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Overall model results for task efficiency. The overall results of the 
moderated-mediated analyses, with and without 5 influential observations, for 
task efficiency are summarized in Table 9
4
. Covariates observed as having an 
effect on transformed efficiency were included in the model (i.e., frequency of 
Microsoft Excel use, general mental ability, and task efficacy). Overall model 
statistics for the path predicting transformed proportion of time on task was 
nonsignificant (F [10, 150] = .58, ns). However, the overall model for the path 
predicting transformed efficiency were significant (F [11, 149]  
= 1.99, p < .05). 
Additionally, one noteworthy difference was observed between the 
analyses conducted with and without influential observations. Specifically, a 
significant effect of both task and goal cues was observed for the effect on 
transformed task efficiency (b = -.77, p = .02, 95% CI [-1.40, -.13] indicating a 
significant difference between both task and goal cues and the task cue 
conditions, excluding influential observations. Follow-up analyses will be 
discussed in the upcoming section on trimmed model testing.
                                                          
4
 Indirect and conditional direct effects for the model tested without influential observations are 
not reported as these effects did not change substantially. 
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Table 9 
Results of the Moderated-Mediated Analyses with Efficiency as the Outcome: 
Model Summary and Coefficients 






































Significant at the 0.01 level. 
* 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
T
 = transformed variable.  
WM = working memory.  N = 161. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was 
coded as the referent group.  D1 = goal cue; D2 = both task and goal cues; D3 = control. b = 
unstandardized regression coefficient. Boot strap sample size = 10,000. 
  
Outcome: Proportion of Time 
on Task
T











 .04 .58 
Intercept .98
*
 .05    
Excel Frequency -.00 .00    
GMA .00 .00    
Task Efficacy -.00 .00    
Predictors      
D1 -.00 .02    
D2 -.01 .02    
D3 -.01 .02    
WM
T
 .00 .00    
D1 * WM
T
 .00 .00    
D2 * WM
T
 .00 .00    
D3 * WM
T
 .00 .00    
Outcome: Efficiency
T
   b SE   R
2






Intercept -4.49 3.81    
Excel Frequency .33* .16    
GMA .20* .09    
Task Efficacy .02 .00    
Predictors      
D1 -.85 .71    
D2 -.78 .72    
D3 .09 .70    
WM
T
 -.00 .00    
D1 * WM
T
 -.00 .00    
D2 * WM
T
 .00 .00    
D3 * WM
T
 .00 .00    
Proportion of Time on Task
T
 .09 3.23    
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Table 9 
Results of the Moderated-Mediated Analyses with Efficiency as the Outcome: 
Model Summary and Coefficients, continued 






































Significant at the 0.01 level. 
* 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
T
 = transformed variable.  
WM = working memory. N = 156. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was 
coded as the referent group.  D1 = goal cue; D2 = both task and goal cues; D3 = control.  
b = unstandardized regression coefficient. Boot strap sample size = 10,000. 
 
 














 .04 .54  
Intercept .98* .05     
Excel Frequency -.00 .00     
GMA .00 .00     
Task Efficacy -.00 .00     
Predictors       
D1 -.00 .02     
D2 -.01 .02     
D3 -.01 .02     
WM
T
 .00 .00     
D1 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
D2 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
D3 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
Outcome: Efficiency
T
 b SE   R
2
 F   
Control Variables 
  
  .08    1.00   
Intercept .11 1.79     
Excel Frequency .08 .07     
GMA .04 .04     
Task Efficacy -.00 .00     
Predictors       
D1 -.54 .32     
D2 -.77
*
 .32     
D3 .60 .33     
WM
T
 -.00 .00     
D1 * WM
T
 -.00 .00     
D2 * WM
T
 -.00 .00     
D3 * WM
T
 .00 .00     
Proportion of Time on Task
T
 .52 1.53     
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The second set of analyses examined the indirect effect of cue on 
transformed efficiency through time spent on task. Analyses controlled for 
frequency of Microsoft Excel use, general mental ability, and task efficacy as 
these were observed as related to transformed efficiency. Table 10 displays the 
unstandardized regression coefficients (b), standard errors (SE), and bootstrapped 
results for the indirect effects. There was no significant difference between the 
task cue and the goal (b = .00) nor between task cue and both task and goal cues 
(b = .00) in predicting transformed efficiency through transformed time spent on 
task. Bootstrap results with a bootstrapped 95% CI around the indirect effect 
included zero (goal cue [-.00, .00]; both task and goal cues [-.00, .00). Therefore, 




Relative Indirect Effect of Task Cue Type on Task Efficiency
T
 through Proportion 
of Time
T
 on Task 
 
   Goal    Both Task and Goal Cues 
Effect   .0000                                     .0000 
SE (Boot)  .0001                          .0001 
BootLLCI            -.0002                                    -.0003 
BootULCI  .0002                                     .0003 
Note: Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was coded as the referent group. 
Effects are relative to the task cue. N = 161. Bootstrap sample size = 10,000. CI = confidence 
interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. Effects are unstandardized coefficient estimates.  
 
T
 = transformed variable.  
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Results for the analyses testing whether transformed working memory 
moderated the relationship between cue type and transformed efficiency are 
presented in Table 11. Results indicated that the conditional direct effects of 
working memory were nonsignificant at 1 standard deviation below the mean on 
transformed working memory (goal cue, b = -.40, ns; both task and goal cues, b = 
-1.03, ns), at the mean (goal cue, b = -.85; both task and goal cues, b = -.79, ns), 
and 1 standard deviation above the mean (goal cue, b = -1.31, ns; both task and 
goal cues, b = -.54, ns). These results indicate that there were no differences 
between the conditional direct effects for participants in the task cue condition 
compared to those in the goal and both task and goal cues conditions at different 
levels of working memory. Therefore, Hypothesis Vb was not supported.   
RESOURCE ALLOCATON  82 
   
Table 11 
 
Conditional Direct Effect of Working Memory
T




Goal Cue Both Task and Goal Cues 
WM      
Level 
Conditional 
Direct Effects SE t LLCI ULCI 
Conditional               
Direct Effects SE t LLCI ULCI 
-1SD -.40 .98  -.41 -2.33 1.53 -1.03 1.07 -.96 -3.15 1.09 
Mean -.85 .71 -1.19 -2.26 .55 -.79 .72 -1.09 -2.20 .63 
+1SD -1.31 1.00 -1.30 -3.29 .68 -.54 .97 -.55 -2.47 1.39 
Note: 
T
 = transformed variable. Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was coded as the referent group. N = 161. Levels for 
working memory are the mean and plus/minus one SD from mean. Direct effects are unstandardized coefficient estimates. Bootstrap sample 
size = 10,000. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit. 
T
 = transformed variable.
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Trimmed model. A significant effect was observed for cue type on task 
efficiency when excluding influential observations. Given that the effects of the 
covariates (i.e., GMA, task efficacy, Excel frequency), the moderator 
(transformed working memory), and the mediator (transformed proportion of time 
on task) included in the model were not significant, a final trimmed model was 
tested to provide the most accurate test and estimates of the significant 
relationships. This model was tested using regression analysis in which 
transformed task efficiency was the dependent variable. Results are reported in 
Table 12.  Results indicated that the overall model was significant, (F [3, 155]  
= 2.68, p < .0.05). The goal cue condition (b = -.73, p < .05, 95% CI [-1.41, -.08]) 
and both task and goal cues condition (b = -.87, p < .05, 95% CI [-1.56, -.22]) 
were significantly lower than the task cue condition on transformed efficiency. 
Given that higher efficiency scores indicate greater efficiency, the results suggest 
that in comparison to participants in the task cue condition, participants in the 
goal and both task and goal cues conditions were less efficient on the task.
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Table 12 




           b SE β t R2 F 




   Intercept 1.97 .23  8.54
*
   
    D1 -.73 .33 -.21 -1.92
*
   
    D2 -.87 .33 -.25 -.2.17
*
   
    D3 -.63 .33 -.18   -2.62   
**
Significant at the 0.01 level. 
* 
Significant at the 0.05 level. 
T
 = transformed variable. N = 156. 
Cue type was dummy coded in these analyses; task cue was coded as the referent group. D1 = goal 
cue; D2 = both task and goal cues; D3 = control. This analysis excludes influential observations. 
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PART IV 
Discussion 
 Using resource theories and naturalistic decision making theory, this study 
sought to identify appropriate allocation strategies for individuals based on 
working memory capacity. The extant literature consistently concludes that 
individuals with low working memory capacity are often more likely to be 
distracted by task-irrelevant information (Lavie et al., 2004; Redick & Engle, 
2006) and less likely to show high performance in situations involving multiple 
stimuli (Buhner, et al., 2006). Essentially, individuals with low working memory 
capacity are more sensitive to task- or stimuli-driven information, while those 
with high working memory capacity better attend to goal-derived information. 
Given this tendency, this study proposed that cueing individuals’ attention 
allocation at the level to which they are more sensitive would result in better 
allocation decisions (i.e., more time on task) and higher performance.  
In the following sections, I will discuss four main observations from the 
current study associated with the effects observed. First, I discuss the allocation 
pattern that emerged during the performance of the task. I anticipated that the 
allocation of attention to the task would be determined by working memory 
capacity. However, this was not observed in the study. Possible explanations for 
the actual allocation patterns observed are presented. Second, I discuss the 
relationship observed between the allocation of attention and task performance. 
This study predicted that performance on the task would benefit from an increase 
in the attention allocated to the task. However, this effect was not observed. 
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Third, it was expected that time spent on the task would explain the effect of cue 
type on performance. Possible reasons for this nonsignificant finding are 
presented. Finally, I discuss the findings observed regarding the effect of cue type 
on efficiency—the observation of allocation cueing at the task-level being 
associated with greater efficiency, in comparison to goal and both goal and task 
cueing. 
Working Memory  
Working memory is associated with the ability to focus on prioritized 
activities as well as goal-relevant information (Lavie et al., 2004; Redick & 
Engle, 2006). In the present study, individuals were presented with a task, 
alongside distracting stimuli, and informed that their priority was performance on 
the task. I expected that individuals with high working memory capacity would 
demonstrate better attention allocation patterns by focusing more time on the task 
and ignoring the non-task-related stimuli presented (HI). However, working 
memory capacity was not associated with allocation pattern in the context 
presented. In this study, the majority of participants spent the entire time on the 
primary task and did not open the distractor e-mails received.  
One possible explanation concerns the element of time pressure induced in 
the study design. During this study, participants were given 15 minutes to 
complete a task that typically requires 25 minutes for completion (Mann et al., 
2013; Mitchell, et al., 2014). This was done to make the task more challenging 
and thereby encourage a need to focus on the task in order to be successful. 
However, it is possible that this element of pressure dissuaded participants from 
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engaging with the e-mails. For one, inducing a time pressure on individuals may 
place pressure on available resources (Bakker & Demerouti, 2007), resources that 
are already limited (Kahneman, 1973). As a result, to meet the demands of the 
situation, participants may have actively managed their time and attention in an 
effort to balance their available resources with that needed to complete the task. 
From a resource allocation perspective, this effect may further be explained by the 
ability-motivation interaction. 
The ability-motivation interaction proposes that the allocation of attention 
is a function of both an individual’s cognitive ability and motivational processes 
(Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). In the present study, working memory, a 
cognitively-based ability, failed to demonstrate any effect on the allocation of 
attentional resources. Theoretically, allocation decisions may have instead been 
directed by the motivational states of participants—influencing their choice to 
engage in the task as well as guiding their self-regulatory processes (e.g., on-task 
vs. off-task activities) throughout the task (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). The 
situational strength hypothesis—the idea that implicit or explicit situational cues 
may restrict the influence of individual differences (Mischel, 1999)—may further 
support this explanation. Explicitly, the addition of a time pressure, or the 
allocation cues, may have strengthened the situation; thereby, suppressing any 
influence of working memory by motivating participants to primarily focus on the 
task.  
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Attention  
The primary allocation of attention to the task was expected to have a 
functional role. Namely, by allocating attention to the task activities and away 
from the off-task activities, performance was expected to increase (HII; 
Minbashian & Luppino, 2014). The absence of this effect may be related to the 
nature of the experimental task. From a resource theory perspective, a task is said 
to be resource-limited when variations in the amount of attention allocated to that 
task influences performance. Alternatively, a task is data-limited when the amount 
of attention allocated to the task has no effect on task performance (Norman & 
Bobrow, 1975). It is possible that the task used was data-limited for the sample. 
For example, average frequency of Excel use was 2.82, an average that 
corresponds with a range between a few times per month and once per month.  
Therefore, participants may have required additional experience and training 
using Excel for their effort or attention on the task to result in a performance pay-
off. Additionally, proportion of time on task could have failed to have an effect as 
a result of statistical limitations. 
The variable representing attention—proportion of time on-task—was 
nonnormally distributed. Given that the majority of participants committed all 
their task-time to the task, this variable demonstrated a “ceiling effect” (Luther, 
2000), whereby the majority of participants clustered around the high end of the 
distribution (i.e., entire proportion of time on task; value of 1). This distribution 
was both skewed and restricted in range. Consequently, the absence of an effect 
of proportion of time on-task on performance (HIIa and HIIb) as well as the 
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absence of a mediating effect of this variable on the cue type-performance 
relationship (HIIIa and HIIIb) could have been a result of violating the normality 
assumption or the restriction in range. 
Allocation Cues 
The most unique contribution of this study was the introduction of 
allocation cues and the proposed contingent effect of working memory on both 
allocation decisions and performance. Specifically, I predicted that individuals 
with high working memory capacity would make better allocation decisions (i.e., 
spend more time on the task) and demonstrate higher performance when cued to 
allocate their attention based their overarching goal. Alternatively, I predicted that 
individuals with low working memory capacity would make better allocation 
decisions (i.e., spend more time on the task) and perform better when cued to 
allocate based on the features of the task. Results found no support for the 
proposed effects.  
There were no contingent effects observed for working memory on the cue 
type and performance relationship. The absence of this proposed moderating 
effect of working memory could be associated to the absence of an effect of 
working memory on allocation behavior, as discussed above. To reiterate, it is 
likely that the allocation behaviors and related performance outcomes observed in 
this study were a function of situational factors such as the time pressure 
experienced by participants. Alternatively, to further speculate, the cues identified 
(i.e., task- and goal-level cues) may, in reality, function in a different manner than 
that proposed. 
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My predictions were based on the assumptions that a) low working 
memory is associated with poor performance under conditions of distractions, and 
b) cueing at the level of the task would be effective only for those with low 
working memory, and at the level of the goal only for high working memory 
individuals. In other words, predictions about the effects of the two cue types 
assumed that each cue would only be effective for a distinct group of individuals. 
However, the actual mechanism of each cue might be equivalent or less distinct 
that assumed, thereby attenuating any distinctions in the effect of working 
memory. That is, regardless of the level, allocation cues may simply aid allocation 
decision. While no interactive effect of working memory and cue type was 
observed, there was evidence of an effect of task cue on efficiency. 
A subset of participants exposed to the task cue were more efficient (i.e., 
completed the task more quickly) than those exposed to the goal and both task and 
goal cues. This finding could be explained in a number for ways. For example, it 
may suggest that task-level cueing activates a sense of urgency. Or, that goal and 
both goal and task cueing places greater demand on cognitive resources, thereby, 
increasing the amount of time needed to complete a task. Task-level cues, may 
provide cognitive short-cuts during allocation situations, in comparison to the 
more cognitively demanding cueing at the level of the goal (c.f., Gonzalez et al., 
2002). Specifically, allocation based on a goal, a top-down process, requires more 
deliberation and controlled thinking—more cognitively demanding processes 
(Evans, 2008; Ruthruff, et al., 2001; Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Therefore, the 
alternative of allocating based on task information, a faster bottom-up process 
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removes the need to engage in cognitively complex thinking and may facilitate 
faster allocation decisions; resulting in more time available to complete the task 
more quickly in comparison to the slower and analytical top-down alternative 
(Schreij et al., 2008).  The absence of an observed effect of cue type on task 
accuracy highlights the importance of considering the performance measure in 
resource allocation contexts. 
Efficiency is unique as a performance measure because it accounts for 
input relative to output in comparison to measures accounting for output only 
(e.g., effectiveness, accuracy); therefore, efficiency is more likely to capture the 
process benefits of an intervention (Beal, Cohen, Burke, & McLendon, 2003). 
Measures of efficiency often consider inputs including time or effort.  Findings 
from the current study imply a more proximal relationship between bottom-up 
processing (i.e., task-level cueing only) and efficiency in comparison to cues 
involving top-down processing (i.e., goal-level or task and goal-level). Therefore, 
this reinforces the value of specifying performance dimensions for any 
intervention aimed at enhancing resource allocation-related performance.  
Practical and Theoretical Implications 
This study has several practical and theoretical implications. First, 
managers interested in enhancing resource allocation-related performance may 
consider interventions geared at bottom-up attentional regulation for tasks where 
efficiency is a valued outcome. A consideration of stimulus- or task-level features 
when allocating attention between competing demands may help to reduce the 
time typically needed to deliberate an allocation decision. To activate bottom-up 
RESOURCE ALLOCATON  92 
 
allocation during task performance, first, employees should be made aware of the 
tasks or responsibilities that are of priority to their organizations or teams. 
Second, when demands arise outside of prioritized activities, the nature of these 
demands should be made salient to employees. For example, if an urgent issue 
arises that is unrelated to a prioritized activity, the urgency of this issue should be 
clearly communicated. As an example, flagging an email as urgent (a task-level 
cue), will help employees to more quickly decide on how to allocate their 
attention; resulting in a positive spillover effect on efficiency for the main task.  
In addition to making task-level stimuli more salient, managers may also 
consider cue recognition training to enhance situational awareness (Grossman et 
al., 2014). To develop this training, managers would first need to identify the 
organization’s needs related to resource allocation, as well as the content of, and 
target for training (Brown, 2002). For example, this assessment would identify the 
primary interests of the organization that should first be prioritized and the 
features of secondary activities that should serve as cues indicating when these 
subordinate demands should be given immediate attention (e.g., an urgent email 
from a particular client).  Following this, training can be designed to guide 
employees’ attention to crucial task- or stimulus-level features—providing 
internal context to enhance allocation decisions. In addition to practical 
implications, this study has implications for theory. 
The effect observed of task-related cues on efficiency as a performance 
outcome highlights an interesting theoretical implication regarding the 
operationalization of task performance. The effect of task-related cues on task 
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efficiency, and not task accuracy, highlights the theoretical (and ultimately 
practical) significance of carefully attending to the conceptualization and 
measurement of performance as a criterion within the organizational psychology 
literature (Austin & Villanova, 1992). Specifically, findings from the current 
study support the value of using multiple criteria, rather than a composite 
measure, of task performance when studying performance as an outcome, 
(Schmidt & Kaplan, 1971). Both the difference in effects observed for efficiency 
and accuracy as well as the lack of any correlation between the two task 
performance dimensions support a multi-dimensional approach. Within the 
domain of resource allocation-related performance, the current findings imply that 
considerations made and interventions used during the allocation process may 
have differential impact on task performance. Additional theoretical implications 
also relate to the foundational theories applied to this study. 
 This study tested the application of both resource and naturalistic decision 
making theories to resource allocation and subsequent performance. From an 
academic perspective the discoveries of this study present a number of potential 
implications for both theories. Naturalistic decision making has traditionally been 
applied to extreme decision making situations such as those encountered by 
firefighters and medical decision-makers; however, suggestions have been made 
supporting its application to more general work contexts (Grossman et al., 2014). 
I expected that by theoretically matching cues to an individual difference, 
allocation decisions could be primed similarly to enhancing cue recognition, as 
discussed by naturalistic decision making theory (Klein, 1998; Klein, 2008). 
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However, failing to find support for this prediction implies that appropriate cues 
may be more contextually-driven. That is, rather than expecting that individuals 
would attend to cues based on their ability levels, it is possible that cues related to 
motivational states or situational demands might be more appropriate for 
influencing allocations decisions. The naturalistic decision making framework has 
made tremendous contributions to the literature in terms of identifying the cue 
recognition patterns of expert decision makers. An understanding of “cue fit” 
based on context would expand the application of naturalistic decision making to 
additional areas within the literature.  
 Further, resource allocation has often been approached from a 
motivational perspective, one that has significantly contributed to understanding 
allocation patterns (e.g., Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Schmidt et al., 2009). 
However, very often, organizational psychologists fail to apply decision making 
theories to topics central to the process of decision making (Dalal, Bonaccio, 
Highhouse, Ilgen, Mohammed, & Slaughter, 2010). Resource allocation might be 
one such example. Naturalistic decision making was applied given the dynamic 
nature of the resource allocation process; results indicate some promise for its 
application to the resource allocation problem. Specifically, it was observed that a 
reliance on particular types of cues to aid allocation decisions may have a positive 
effect on task efficiency. However, that is not to say that other decision making 
theories are not applicable to the process. Therefore, future research on the 
application of alternative decision making approaches such the dual process 
framework (Evans, 2008), adaptive decision making (Hammond, 1955), and fast 
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and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) may also be viable areas to 
consider for understanding resource allocation. 
Future Research 
 There are several other rich areas for future research based on the above 
findings. First, this study found support for the effect of cueing stimulus- or task-
directed attention allocation. It is reasonable to suspect that in addition to task 
cues, more specific cue types might also be effective at guiding better allocation 
decisions and influencing related performance outcomes. For example, resource 
theories highlight the role of task features, such as difficulty, as a relevant 
contextual variable to the resource allocation process (Langholtz et al., 1994). 
Further, additional features of the work context such as time, social structure, and 
accountability (Johns, 2006) may also impact allocation decisions. Understanding 
any moderating effects of these features, as well as determining the appropriate 
cueing strategies based on contextual differences and demands are promising 
areas for future research. 
In addition to contextual features, future research may explore the 
interactive effects of working memory capacity with other individual differences 
such as personality differences. While no effect of working memory was observed 
in this study, the motivating effect of context was proposed as a potential 
explanation for this finding (or lack thereof). Exploring motivation-related 
individual differences might provide further nuanced explanations for the varying 
effects of working memory. Variables such as conscientiousness and goal 
orientation that positively relate to job performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; 
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VandeWalle et. al, 2001), may supplement limits to cognitive resources such as 
low working memory capacity.  In highly distracting situations, where adequate 
contextual signals (such as time pressure) are absent, a conscientious individual 
may possess internal cueing mechanisms to aid appropriate attentional allocation 
decisions and practices. Or, an individual high on mastery goal orientation may 
appropriately select amongst activities to accelerate goal accomplishment 
(Schmidt et al., 2009). In this study avoid performance goal orientation and 
conscientiousness were significantly related task accuracy.  It could be that these 
variables, rather than working memory, are more important for predicting 
sustained accuracy in the resource allocation context. Future research exploring 
these effects is viable for better understanding the nature of allocation decisions. 
 Finally, the reliance on teams has increased significantly as organizations 
attempt to address more complex issues (Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 
2008). Often, teams are composed of individuals with competing priorities or 
serving on multiple teams (O'leary, Mortensen, & Woolley, 2011). Resource 
allocation is a critical research domain with relevance to the organizational teams’ 
literature. Future research exploring antecedents of effective allocation decisions 
is a domain worth exploring. For example, team composition and emergent states 
such as transactive memory might be relevant predictors of resource allocation 
decisions. 
Limitations 
 This study had some methodological limitations that could have 
influenced the results. First, the study used an experimental design with a sample 
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of undergraduate students at a single time point. An experimental design was 
selected to enhance the internal validity of the study’s findings. However, internal 
validity often comes at the expense of external validity. Therefore, before making 
generalizations based on the observed findings, replication of the study’s results 
using an applied sample is necessary. Further, the task design accounted for a 
single performance period. This may have limited the possibility of more robust 
effects emerging, in comparison to a longitudinal design. In particular, given the 
dynamic nature of resource allocation and observations of allocation behaviors 
changing over time (Atkinson & Birch, 1978), a design accounting for temporal 
effects may have provided opportunities for additional findings. 
 Second, an alternative operationalization of attention could have produced 
different results. While the ManicTime software was extremely useful for 
tracking time, as a proxy for attention, this operationalization of time/attention 
might have resulted in the loss of some information. For example, when an e-mail 
was received, a participant may not have clicked on the link to open it, but may 
have spent several milliseconds reading the title of the e-mail. ManicTime would 
not have recorded off-task time in this situation. A more precise measure of 
attention such as eye-tracking could have provided a more valid measure of 
attention. 
Conclusion 
  The opening illustration describes Beth as she attempts to complete a 
revision and resubmission while being distracted by e-mails. This situation, and 
others of greater magnitude, is a familiar one to many employees. The above 
RESOURCE ALLOCATON  98 
 
research proposed that a solution for Beth, and others like her, could be found by 
considering Beth’s working memory capacity. This prediction was not supported.  
However, a question remains as to whether the use of cues is ever effective.  
 With the proliferation of technological and other advancements, 
organizational environments have become increasingly distracting. These 
distractions are associated with significant productivity and financial losses. 
Understanding contextual and individual differences associated with effective 
allocation decisions is a valuable domain for research. This study found that 
cueing individuals to allocate their attention based on features of the task might be 
associated with more efficient task performance. This effect implies that 
interventions reinforcing or making task features more salient, may support 
efficiency within distracting work contexts. Therefore, while allocation cues may 
be effective, this effectiveness might be contingent upon the operationalization of 
task performance.
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Appendix A: Study Task 
 
Instructions for Training 
Before completing the experimental task, you will watch a video that will serve as 
a training guide to prepare you for the task. This video will last for 15 minutes 
and will be followed by a brief 10-minute questionnaire to assess what you have 
learned. 
Instructions for the Task 
In this task, you will complete a series of questions which require you to perform 
basic functions in Excel to answer the questions correctly. Completing the 
questions correctly and as quickly as possible is how you gain points in this 
task. Gaining as many points possible out of 36 is the goal of this task. While 
answering the questions, you will also receive some e-mails. These e-mails will 
include information that you may or may not find interesting. Attending to these 
e-mails is entirely up to you. 
(manipulation text inserted here) 
Your objective is to gain as many points as possible in the session. The Excel 
task is your most important responsibility and will allow you to earn up to 36 
points. The 10 participants who have earned the most number of points will 
receive a $25 Starbucks gift card at the end of the quarter. The research assistant 
will take your name, and e-mail address, and record your total number of points 
on a sheet at the end of the experiment if you are interested in entering the 
competition for the gift card. Your name will not be linked to the other measures 
you completed for the study. 
Please submit your responses using the Qualtrics survey page opened and 
minimized on your desktop. Please do not use the split-screen option as you 
work on the files and remember to save your work. 
You have 15 minutes to complete this task. If you are able to complete the task 
in less than 15 minutes, you will receive a bonus in the number of points you 
achieve based on the number of minutes you have remaining. For example, a 
participant who completes the task in 10 minutes will receive 5 points in bonus 
points while a participant who completes the task in 14 minutes will receive a 1-
point bonus. The researcher will let you know when you have 5 minutes 
remaining. 
Task: 
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A. The researchers defined “junior” participants as being below 18 years and 
“senior” participants as being above 27 years. Color code each participant as 
being “junior” (blue), or “senior” (yellow). Save your work after color coding.  
 
  1.   How many participants are categorized as “junior”?  3 (1 point) 
 
  2.   How many participants are categorized as “senior”? 12 (1 point) 
 
B. Curious about living arrangements in their sample, the researchers wanted to 
compare types of residences to the number of people living in these 
residences. 
 






1. List the names of the people who live in a dorm, and also have 6 or 
more people in residence: Albert, Joanne, George (3 points) 
 
 Turn off filters and return to the original data set.  
 
C. According to a different survey, Americans watch an average of 15 hours of 
television per week.  
 
1.   How many participants in this study match exactly the national 







2. List the names of the males who watch more than 26 hours of TV per 
week: Bradley, Mario, Robert, Lawrence, Steven, Don, Steve, George, 
Paul, Albert, Louis, Frank, Carmen (13 points) 
 
 
 Turn off filters and return to the original data set.  
 
D. The researchers in this study were also interested in the types of college 
students that credit card companies market their credit cards to. They 
compared the 6 summer job types to the 5 categories of cards people carry. 
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 Summer Job Type   Credit Card Type 
 1 Managerial and Professional 1 American Express 
2 Sales and Office 2 Visa 
3 Service 3 Master Card 
4 Agricultural and Natural 
Resources 
4 Discover 
5 Production, Craft, Repair 5 Other 




1.   List the names of the students with summer jobs in the service industry 
who carry a card “other” than one of the major brands listed in the 
survey: Debbie, Sheila, Laura, Ruby, Denise (5 points) 
 
 Turn off filters and return to the original data set.  
 
E. Politics are typically an important issue on college campuses. Color code all 
participants who identify as “Liberal” or “Extremely Liberal” (below 3) as 
blue, and all participants who identify as “Conservative” or “Extremely 
Conservative” (above 5) as yellow. 
 
 In the last 
election… 
1 Voted 
2 Did not vote 
 
 Political View 
1 Extremely Liberal 
2 Liberal 








1. Among those who voted in the last election, how many people identify 
themselves as liberal or extremely liberal? 35 (1 point) 
 
2. Among those who did not vote in the last election, how many people 
identify themselves as conservative or extremely conservative? 20 (1 
point) 
 
 For the following task, please open Sheet 2 using the tab on the bottom 
and use the data set on that sheet.  






F. Please create a chart showing the commute times of individuals. Save your 
work after completing your chart. (5 points) 
 
 For the following task, please open Sheet 3 using the tab on the bottom 





G. Please create a chart showing the individuals’ hours of watching TV per week 
for the participants who were born in October. Save your work after 
























RESOURCE ALLOCATON  121 
 
Appendix B: E-mails to be Sent During the Task 
 
E-mail 1: Ideas on how to use your Starbucks Gift Card: 21 Best Starbucks 
Drinks! 
 
With so many delicious beverages, it might be hard to choose the best Starbucks 
drinks, but I can help! I have 21 best Starbucks drinks you'll thoroughly enjoy! 
Whether you like coffee or tea, iced, or hot, these beverages, will definitely 





E-mail 2: 4 GMAIL HACKS THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU WORK 
 
IF OPENING YOUR INBOX GIVES YOU A PANIC ATTACK, TRY THESE 
SIMPLE MOVES TO MAKE GMAIL FEEL MORE MANAGEABLE. 
BY MADISON FELLER, LEVO LEAGUE 
 
I’ll be honest—I’ve had mixed feelings about Gmail. Sometimes it’s fantastic, 
like when my best friend and I send each other cool links all morning while 
simultaneously talking on Gchat. But other times, as I’m watching my inbox fill 
up at the speed of light, it can just be overwhelming. Gmail and I have finally 
come to a mutually respectful relationship (think Kanye’s post-VMA apology to 
T-Swift), but it’s been a long road. These four hacks have paved the way, and 
once you’ve got them down, I promise Gmail will feel like a whole new ball 
game. 
 
1. YOU CAN FAKE THE TIMESTAMP 
As a self-proclaimed night owl, I never really thought anyone noticed my late-
night e-mailing, until one morning I came into the office and my supervisor 
(whom I’d e-mailed during a late-night catch-up binge) asked, "Were you 
working at 2 a.m.?" Busted. I realized that if I wanted to be taken seriously, it 
would be a lot better if my e-mails looked like they were being sent at 8 a.m. 
instead of at 3 a.m. And then I discovered Boomerang. 
Boomerang is a Gmail app that allows you to schedule e-mails, set up snooze 
messages, and get reminders. You can easily schedule e-mails to go out at any 
time, so it’ll look like you’re sending something at 8 a.m. on Monday, even 
though you scheduled it at 11 p.m. the night before. You can also choose to 
"boomerang" e-mails, meaning you can mark an e-mail to leave your inbox and 
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return on a certain date. Let’s say there’s a reminder for a networking event next 
month and as much as you want the e-mail, it’s cluttering your inbox. Just choose 
to "boomerang" the message, so that it leaves your inbox for now but returns two 
days before the event. You can also ask Boomerang to send you a reminder if 
nobody replies to an e-mail, so you’ll never forget to follow up with people again. 
Tip: When scheduling an e-mail, I do like to BCC myself just to be absolutely, 
100% sure that everything is getting sent out. 
 
2. YOU CAN INSTANTLY PULL UP SOMEONE’S NAME, TITLE, AND 
MUTUAL CONNECTIONS 
You know how before cold e-mailing someone important, you can spend a good 
30 minutes stalking their LinkedIn profile, searching for any mutual connections, 
and triple-checking the spelling of their first and last name? Well, Rapportive is 
your new networking best friend. This Gmail extension will pull up LinkedIn 
profiles right inside of Gmail, so you can see someone’s profile alongside your 
message. Whether you’re sending or receiving an e-mail, Rapportive will give 
you the quick information you need to make sure your message is accurate and 
well-informed. 
 
3. YOU CAN UNSEND A HASTILY WRITTEN MESSAGE 
This new Gmail feature made headlines last week—and it’s true, whether you 
fired off a nasty e-mail to your boss or any of these other five mistakes, you can 
now take it back. Gmail’s new undo feature will let you unsend an e-mail up to 30 
seconds after you hit send. To enable the feature, just click the gear in the top 
right-hand corner of your Gmail window, go to Settings, scroll down to "Undo 
Send", make sure the button is checked, and then save your changes. 
Now after you send an e-mail, a yellow bar will appear at the top of your inbox, 
asking if you would like to undo. I think I speak for everyone when I say this 
magic button makes us breathe a huge sigh of relief. 
 
4. YOU PLOW THROUGH YOUR INBOX IN RECORD SPEED 
When my friend first told me about the Gmail keyboard shortcuts, I was 
underwhelmed at the suggestion, even though she claimed she loved them. But 
being one who doesn’t knock it till I try it, I decided to give them a whirl. And, oh 
my, these shortcuts are a game changer. To enable them for Gmail, go to the gear 
on the top right-hand corner of your main page, go to Settings, scroll down to 
Keyboard Shortcuts, make sure they’re turned on, and then save your changes. 
Now you can whiz through Gmail without (almost) ever leaving the keyboard. 
Need to draft a new e-mail? Just press "c." Need to mark something as important? 
Just press "+." Need to mark an e-mail unread? It’s as easy as hitting "Shift and 
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u." Get ready for your coworkers to be shocked (or at least impressed) by how 
quickly you get through the morning e-mails. 
This article originally appeared on Levo and is reprinted with permission. 
 
 




Your last name gives you a sense of identity and helps you discover who you are 
and where you come from. 
 
Some of the interesting facts you'll learn about your surname: 
Meaning and History 
Where your family lived in the U.S. and U.K. 
Average life expectancy 
When your family immigrated to the U.S. 
Common occupations 






E-mail 4: New Website Reveals Personal Information Even Google Can't Find 
 
 
Ever try Googling someone only to come up with basic information and maybe a 
link or two to an outdated social media profile? There's a new website going 
around that promises to reveal much more than just a simple google search can 
show you. 
 
Been issued a speeding ticket? Failed to stop at a stop sign? What about your 
family members? And friends? If you are like most of us, the answer to at least 
one of those questions is “yes”—the vast majority of us have slipped up at least 
once or twice. 
 
An innovative new website—Instant Checkmate is now revealing the full “scoop” 
on millions of Americans. 
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Instant Checkmate aggregates hundreds of millions of publicly available criminal, 
traffic, and arrest records and posts them online so they can easily be searched by 
anyone. Members of the site can literally begin searching within seconds, and are 
able to check as many records as they like (think: friends, family, neighbors, etc. 
etc.). 
 
Previously, if you wanted to research someone’s arrest records, you might have 
had to actually go in to a county court office—in the appropriate county—and 
formally request information on an individual. This process may have taken days 
or weeks, or the information might not have been available at all. With websites 
like Instant Checkmate, however, a background check takes just a few clicks of 
the mouse, and no more than a minute or two. 
 
Want to give it a real-world test? Pull your own report. You might reveal long 
forgotten crimes you committed in your younger days. Even been busted for 
possession of a fake ID? Been caught shoplifting? Get in trouble with the cops for 
being rowdy at a bar? Instant Checkmate may reveal exactly when and where you 
were arrested. 
 
"You might reveal long forgotten crimes you committed in your younger days." 
After that, search all of your family members. If your aunt gets a speeding ticket 
every month, you’ll know. If your parents have kept arrests hidden from you, you 
could uncover them instantly. 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of Instant Checkmate is that it shows not only 
criminal records, but also more general background information like marriage 
records, divorce records, various types of licenses (medical, firearm, aviation, 
etc.), previous addresses, phone numbers, birthdates, estimated income levels and 
even satellite imagery of known addresses—it’s really pretty scary just how much 
information is in these reports. 
 
In addition to giving information on the specific person you search for, the report 
also includes a scrolling list of “local sex offenders” for whatever region you’ve 
searched—along with a map plotting out the locations of those offenders. Peruse 
the ones that show up in your report. You might even discover someone you 
know on the list. 
 
"You might even discover someone you know on the list" 
Prepared to be shocked? Anyone can start running background checks on Instant 
Checkmate within a few seconds—just click this link to get started. 
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If you would like to search someone you know, click here. 
 
E-mails 5: Google self-driving car involved in first injury accident 
 
FILE - In this May 13, 2015, file photo, Google's self-driving Lexus car drives 
along street during a demonstration at Google campus in Mountain View, Calif. 
Google says that one of its self-driving cars has been involved in an injury 
accident for the first time. The tech giant disclosed Thursday, July 16, 2015, that 
one of its SUVs was rear-ended in its home city of Mountain View, and the three 
people on board complained of minor whiplash. All were released from the 
hospital soon after the July 1 collision. (AP Photo/Tony Avelar, File) 
LOS ANGELES (AP) — Google Inc. revealed Thursday that one of its self-
driving car prototypes was involved in an injury accident for the first time. 
 
In the collision, a Lexus SUV that the tech giant outfitted with sensors and 
cameras was rear-ended in Google's home city of Mountain View, where more 
than 20 prototypes have been self-maneuvering through traffic. 
 
The three Google employees on board complained of minor whiplash, were 
checked out at a hospital and cleared to go back to work following the July 1 
collision, Google said. The driver of the other car also complained of neck and 
back pain. 
 
In California, a person must be behind the wheel of a self-driving car being tested 
on public roads to take control in an emergency. Google typically sends another 
employee in the front passenger seat to record details of the ride on a laptop. In 
this case, there was also a back seat passenger. 
 
Google has invested heavily as a pioneer of self-driving cars, technology it 
believes will be safer and more efficient than human drivers. 
 
This was the 14th accident in six years and about 1.9 million miles of testing, 
according to the company. Google has said that its cars have not caused any of the 
collisions — though in 2011 an employee who took a car to run an errand rear-
ended another vehicle while the Google car was out of self-driving mode. 
 
In 11 of the 14, Google said its car was rear-ended. 
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In a blog posted Thursday, the head of Google's self-driving car program, Chris 
Urmson, wrote that his SUVs "are being hit surprisingly often" by distracted 
drivers, perhaps people looking at their phones. 
 
"The clear theme is human error and inattention," Urmson wrote. "We'll take all 
this as a signal that we're starting to compare favorably with human drivers." 
 
In a telephone interview, Urmson said his team was exploring whether its cars 
could do something to alert distracted drivers before a collision. Honking would 
be one possibility, but Urmson said he worried that could start to annoy residents 
of Mountain View. 
According to an accident report that Google filed with the California Department 
of Motor Vehicles about the July 1 crash: 
Google's SUV was going about 15 mph in self-driving mode behind two other 
cars as the group approached an intersection with a green light. 
 
The first car slowed to a stop so as not to block the intersection — traffic on the 
far side was not moving. The Google car and the other car in front of it also 
stopped. 
 
Within about a second, a fourth vehicle rear-ended the Google car at about 17 
mph. On-board sensors showed the other car did not break. 
 
The driver of that car reported "minor neck and back pain." The SUV's rear 
bumper was slightly damaged, while the vehicle that struck it lost its front 
bumper. 
 
Mountain View police responded, but did not file an accident report. 
___ 
Contact Justin Pritchard at http://twitter.com/lalanewsman  
 
 




How would you like to win a $100 Starbucks Gift card instead of a $25 Gift 
Card? 
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Interested? Here’s how you can. 
To earn this gift card you will be required to recruit 10 participants to complete 
this study within the next 2 weeks. In order to qualify, you MUST send an e-mail 
to the researcher at shaniquebrown@outlook.com within the next 7 minutes. E-
mails sent after this time will not qualify for this opportunity. The e-mail 
should include your name, e-mail address, contact number, the name and contact 
information of the 10 people who you believe would be interested in participating 
in this study. You are also required to include a 2-3 sentence summary of why you 
believe each person would be interested in participating. 
Entering for this $100 gift card will disqualify you from earning Sona Credits for 
your participation today. 
 
E-mail 7: Sign up for additional Experiments on Sona Systems 
Have you signed up for enough studies on Sona for the quarter? Remember, you 
need to earn at least 5 credits for each Introduction to Psychology class that you 
are enrolled in.    
 
For more information about the Research Participation signup system, students 
can consult the psychology department web page (http://psychology.depaul.edu) 
under “Research” or e-mail the Research Participation Coordinator 
(psychexperiments@depaul.edu). 
 
E-mail 8: Need Help Using Microsoft Excel? 
Here are some tips on using Microsoft Excel 
Greetings! In this tutorial, you'll learn about rows, columns, cells, worksheets 
(spreadsheets), and workbooks. We'll discuss how to add rows and columns, and 
how to move around in a worksheet. We'll learn how to enter data, and protect 
cells and spreadsheets. We'll tell you everything you need to know to get started 
using Microsoft Excel. 
RESOURCE ALLOCATON  128 
 
If you like video-based introduction, check out Excel 2010 Tutorial for Beginners. 
We have this course (over 9 hours of hands-on lessons) and find it very well done. 
(You can watch some chapters online.) 
Now - let's begin learning Microsoft Excel! 
The Excel Worksheet (Spreadsheet) and Workbook 
An Excel worksheet, or spreadsheet, is a two-dimensional grid with columns and 
rows. Look at the spreadsheet below. The column names are letters of the 
alphabet starting with A, and the rows are numbered chronologically starting with 
the number one. The cells in the first row are A1, B1, C1, and so on. And the cells 
in the first column are A1, A2, A3, and so on. These are called cell names or cell 
references. 
We use cell references when creating math formulas or functions. For example, 
the formula to add the contents of cells B2 and B3 together is: =B2+B3. For more 
information, see our tutorial Excel Math Basics: Writing Formulas and 
Expressions. 
Moving From Cell to Cell 
The arrow keys can be used to move left, right, up, and down from the current 
cell. Press the Enter key to move to the cell immediately below the current cell, 
and press the Tab key to move one cell to the right. 
Selecting Cells 
There are a variety of ways to select cells in an Excel spreadsheet: 
Excel 2010 missing manual 
To select one cell, click in the cell. 
To select one or more rows of cells, click on the row number(s). 
To select one or more columns of cells, click on the column letter(s). 
To select a group of contiguous cells, click in a corner cell and, with the left 
mouse button depressed, drag the cursor horizontally and/or vertically until all of 
the cells you want selected are outlined in black. 
To select multiple cells that are not contiguous, press and hold the Ctrl key while 
clicking in the desired cells. 
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To select every cell in the worksheet, click in the upper right corner of the 
worksheet to the left of "A." 
Entering Data into Cells 
To enter data into a cell, just click in the cell and begin typing. What you type 
also displays in the Formula Bar. When entering dates, Excel defaults to the 
current year if the year portion of the date is not entered. 
You may edit cell contents from the Formula bar, or from directly inside the cell. 
To edit from the Formula Bar, select the cell and click inside the Formula Bar. 
When done typing, either press the Enter key or click inside another cell. To edit 
directly inside a cell, either double click inside the cell, or select the cell and press 
the F2 key. 
Each cell has a specific format. This format tells Excel how the data inside the 
cell should be displayed. See our separate tutorial on Formatting Cells in 
Microsoft Excel. 
Propagating Cell Contents 
There are multiple ways to propagate or fill data from one cell to adjacent cells. 
Let's begin with two popular keyboard shortcuts that allow us to fill down, or fill 
to the right: 
To fill adjacent cells with the contents of the cell above, select the cell with the 
data and the cells to be filled and press Ctrl + D (the Ctrl key and the D key) to fill 
down. 
To fill adjacent cells with the contents of the cell to the left, select the cell with 
the data and cells to be filled and press Ctrl + R (the Ctrl key and the R key) to fill 
to the right. 
To propagate in any direction, use the Fill Handle. Click in a cell with data to be 
copied, hover the cursor over the cell's lower right corner until the cursor changes 
to a thin plus sign (+) or a dark square, and drag up, down, left, or right to fill the 
cells. 
If the data to be copied is a date, number, time period, or a custom-made series, 
the data will be incremented by one instead of just copied when the Fill Handle is 
used. For example, to display the months of the year in column A, type January in 
cell A1, drag the Fill Handle down to cell A12, and the months will display, in 
order, in column A! 
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Moving and Copying Cells 
To move cell contents, right-click in the selected cell and click Cut. To copy cell 
contents, click Copy. Then right-click in the new location and click Paste. To 
paste a group of cells, right-click in the cell where the top left cell of the group 
should be located, and click Paste. Remove the animated border around the 
original cell by pressing the ESC key, or start typing in a new cell. 
Adding and Deleting Rows and Columns 
Excel 2010 Bible 
To insert a new row in a spreadsheet, right-click on a row number, and click 
Insert. Excel always inserts the row ABOVE the row that was clicked on. To 
delete a row, right-click on the row number, and click Delete. 
To insert a new column, right-click on a column letter and click Insert. Excel 
always inserts the column to the LEFT of the column that was clicked on. To 
delete a column, right-click on the column letter, and click Delete. 
Protecting a Worksheet (Spreadsheet) or Workbook 
To protect a worksheet or workbook in Excel 2007, click the Review tab, click 
Protect Worksheet or Protect Workbook, and click OK (entering a password first, 
if desired). When a worksheet or workbook is already protected, the icons in the 
Review tab are Unprotect Worksheet and Unprotect Workbook. 
In earlier versions of Excel, click Tools > Protection, click Protect Sheet or 
Protect Workbook, and click OK (entering a password first, if desired). When a 
worksheet or workbook is already protected, the menu items read Unprotect Sheet 
and Unprotect Workbook. 
Don't enter a password unless absolutely necessary. If you forget the password, 
you won't be able to unprotect the worksheet, so you won't be able to change, 
delete, or format any of the Locked cells! 
Working with Worksheets (Spreadsheets) 
Viewing, Renaming, Inserting, and Deleting Worksheets 
Worksheet tabs are found in the bottom left area of the workbook. To view a 
worksheet, click on its tab. If the workbook window is not wide enough to display 
all of the tabs, use the arrows to the left of the tabs to navigate left or right, or 
right-click on any of the arrows and select the tab from the list that displays. 
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To rename a spreadsheet, right-click on the spreadsheet tab, select Rename from 
the context menu, and type a new name. Or, double-click on the worksheet tab 
and type a new name. 
To insert a worksheet, right-click on a worksheet tab and select Insert from the 
menu. Excel always inserts the spreadsheet to the left of the current worksheet. 
To delete a worksheet, right-click on the worksheet tab and select Delete from the 
context menu. 
Author: Keynote Support 
Moving Worksheets (Spreadsheets) 
Sometimes we want our spreadsheets to be arranged in a different order. To move 
a worksheet in the same workbook, right-click on the tab of the source worksheet 
and click "Move or Copy." In the Move or Copy window, click the name of the 
worksheet that you want the sheet to be inserted before, and click OK. 
To move a spreadsheet to a new workbook, right-click on the tab of the source 
spreadsheet and click "Move or Copy." In the Move or Copy window, click the 
drop-down arrow under “To Book:” and click (new book). Excel removes the 
worksheet from the existing workbook and opens a new workbook containing the 
moved worksheet. 
To move a worksheet to another existing workbook, we recommend copying the 
worksheet as instructed below, and then deleting the original sheet when the 
worksheet has been successfully pasted. Using cut and paste is an option, but if 
something happens to the PC before pasting occurs, a valuable worksheet could 
be lost. 
Copying Worksheets (Spreadsheets) 
Excel 2010 missing manual 
Rather than start from scratch, it is often easier to copy, and then modify, an 
existing worksheet. To copy a worksheet in the same workbook, right-click on the 
tab of the source worksheet and click "Move or Copy." In the Move or Copy 
window, check the “create a copy” box, click the name of the spreadsheet that you 
want the sheet to be inserted before, and click OK. 
To copy a worksheet into a new workbook, right-click on the tab of the source 
worksheet and click "Move or Copy." In the Move or Copy window, click the 
drop-down arrow under “To Book:” and click (new book). Excel opens a new 
workbook containing the copied spreadsheet. 
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To copy a worksheet from one workbook to another existing workbook, right-
click the top left corner cell to select all cells and click Copy. Open the other 
Excel workbook, find an empty worksheet, right-click the top left corner cell to 
select all cells, and click Paste. Return to the first worksheet and press ESC to 
remove the animated border. 
In Closing... 
Excel error messages begin with a pound sign (#). The most common error, 
#####, indicates that the cell is too narrow to display all of the data. Make the 
column wider by placing the cursor on the right side of the column heading and 
dragging the column edge to the right. 
We hope this article has been helpful. If you want to learn more about Excel, and 
you're interested in a video-based course, check out Excel 2010 Tutorial for 
Beginners, with over 9 hours of hands-on lessons. We've reviewed it and it's a 
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Appendix C: Cue Type Manipulation and Checks 
 
Goal-Cue and Manipulation Check 
When deciding how to attend to information in our environment, we often use a 
top-down or goal-oriented strategy. This means that we may make decisions about 
what to attend to based on the goals or expectations that we have. Using this 
strategy allows us to be able to filter out irrelevant information that is not related 
to our goal. Also, attending to information in our environment in a top-down 
manner, or based on our goals, assists us in making better decisions about what is 
important for us to attend to, and allows us to persist toward meeting our goal. For 
example, you can set an overall goal to achieve as many points possible out of 36, 
which will help you to focus on activities that help you to earn points. For 
example, if you feel you are close to achieving your goal during the activity, you 
will determine that you have more time to spend reading an e-mail; however, if 
you feel that you are behind on achieving your goal, then you will put more effort 
into completing another question quickly before reading an e-mail. Another 
example of a goal is how you will plan you time. So, at the beginning of the task, 
you may decide to check e-mails at specific intervals based on how you are 
progressing on the task. 
Please complete the following questions: 
1) Next to each question you will see the number of points that each question 
is worth; please set a goal for yourself (number of points you would like to make). 
What is the goal you have set for yourself during this activity? 
__________________________________________________________________
___________ 
2) What are the names of the strategies discussed in the instructions for 








RESOURCE ALLOCATON  134 
 
3) What is one recommendation to determine how to attend to the e-mails 





Task-Cue and Manipulation Check 
When deciding how to attend to information in our environment, we often use a 
bottom-up or stimulus-driven strategy. This means that we may make decisions 
about what to attend to based on the nature of the information ‘popping up’ in our 
environment. Using this strategy allows us to be able to filter out irrelevant 
information based on how critical or urgent the information is. Also, attending to 
information in our environment in a bottom-up manner, or based on the features 
of the information assists us in making decisions about what we need to attend to 
based on how critical that information is to us. In other words, if something “pops 
up” that demands immediate attention, we tend to attend to that information 
immediately. For example, if you receive an e-mail that is far more critical to you 
than the task, then you may decide to attend to it immediately. One 
recommendation as you complete the task is to consider how meaningful the e-
mails are to you as you work on the Excel task; this will help you to determine 
when you should reasonably attend to this information. Another recommendation 
is to quickly scan the title of the e-mails as they pop-up to quickly determine if 
you need to attend to them. 
Please complete the following questions: 
1) What is the name of the strategy discussed in the instructions for making 
decisions about attending to the e-mails? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________ 




3) What is one recommendation to determine how to attend to the e-mails 
based on this strategy? 





Task and Goal Cues and Manipulation Check 
When deciding how to attend to information in our environment, we often use one 
of two strategies: a top-down or goal-oriented strategy or a bottom-up or stimulus-
driven strategy.   
A top-down strategy means that we may make decisions about what to attend to 
based on the goals or expectations that we have. Using this strategy allows us to 
be able to filter out irrelevant information that is not related to our goal. Also, 
attending to information in our environment in a top-down manner, or based on 
our goals, assists us in making better decisions about what is important for us to 
attend to, and allows us to persist toward meeting our goal. For example, you can 
set an overall goal to achieve as many points possible out of 36, which will help 
you to focus on activities that help you to earn points. For example, if you feel 
you are close to achieving your goal during the activity, you will determine that 
you have more time to spend reading an e-mail; however, if you feel that you are 
behind on achieving your goal, then you will put more effort into completing 
another question quickly before reading an e-mail. Another example of a goal is 
how you will plan you time. So, at the beginning of the task, you may decide to 
check e-mails at specific intervals based on how you are progressing on the task. 
A bottom-up strategy means that we may make decisions about what to attend to 
based on the nature of the information ‘popping up’ in our environment. Using 
this strategy allows us to be able to filter out irrelevant information based on how 
critical or urgent the information is. Also, attending to information in our 
environment in a bottom-up manner, or based on the features of the information 
assists us in making decisions about what we need to attend to based on how 
critical that information is to us. In other words, if something “pops up” that 
demands immediate attention, we tend to attend to that information immediately. 
For example, if you receive an e-mail that is far more critical to you than the task, 
then you may decide to attend to it immediately. One recommendation as you 
complete the task is to consider how meaningful the e-mails are to you as you 
work on the Excel task; this will help you to determine when you should 
reasonably attend to this information. Another recommendation is to quickly scan 
the title of the e-mails as they pop-up to quickly determine if you need to attend to 
them. 
Please complete the following questions: 
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1) Next to each question you will see the number of points that each question 
is worth; please set a goal for yourself (number of points you would like to 




2) What are the names of the strategies discussed in the instructions for 
making decisions about attending to the e-mails? 
__________________________________________________________________
__________ 




4) What is one recommendation of each strategy to determine how to attend 
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Appendix D: Informed Consent (Online Pre-test) 
 
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
How Do You Decide? A Decision making Study: Part I 
 
Principal Investigator: Shanique Brown 
 
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA 
 
Department (School, College): Department of Psychology 
 
Faculty Advisor: Suzanne Bell, Department of Psychology, College of Science 
and Health 
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more 
about decision making.  This study is being conducted by Shanique Brown, a 
graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain her Doctoral 
degree. This research is being supervised by her faculty advisor, Suzanne Bell. 
 
We hope to include about 180 people in the research. 
 
Why are you being asked to be in the research? 
You are invited to participate in this study because you are likely to engage in 
some decision making behaviors on a daily basis. You must be age 18 or older to 
be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of people under the 
age of 18. 
 
What is involved in being in the research study? 
If you agree to be in this study, being in the research involves completing a brief 
online survey. 
 
Once you have completed this portion of the study, you will be directed to 
schedule the in-lab portion of the study. 
 
How much time will this take? 
This portion of the study will take about 30 minutes to complete.  
 
Are there any risks involved in participating in this study? 
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would 
encounter in daily life.  You may feel uncomfortable or embarrassed about 
answering certain questions.  You do not have to answer any question you do not 
want to.  
    
Are there any benefits to participating in this study? 
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You will not personally benefit from being in this study.   
 
We hope that what we learn will help other researchers and practitioners to 
improved resource allocation performance.  
 
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study? 
You will be awarded .5 hour research credit for this portion of the study. 
 
Are there any costs to me for being in the research? 
There is no cost to you for being in the research.  
 
Can you decide not to participate?   
Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate.  
There will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you 
decide not to participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the 
research after you begin participating.  
 
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the 
information collected for the research be protected? 
The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be 
combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we 
write about the study or publish a paper to share the research with other 
researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. We 
will not include your name or any information that will directly identify you. We 
will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from 
knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is.  However, 
some people might review or copy our records that may identify you in order to 
make sure we are following the required rules, laws, and regulations.  For 
example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may review your 




What if new information is learned that might affect my decision to be in the 
study? 
If we learn of new information or make changes to any portion of the study, and 
the new information or changes might affect your willingness to stay in this study, 
the new information will be provided to you.  If this happens, you may be asked 
to provide ongoing consent (in writing or verbally). 
 
Who should be contacted for more information about the research? 
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, 
please ask any questions that might come to mind now.  Later, if you have 
questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get 
additional information or provide input about this research, you can contact the 
researcher, Shanique Brown at 618-560-3719 or sbrown82@depaul.edu.   
RESOURCE ALLOCATON  139 
 
 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review 
Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you 
may contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research 
Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by e-mail at 
sloesspe@depaul.edu.   
 
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if: 
 
 Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the 
research team. 
 You cannot reach the research team. 
 You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent from the Subject:   
 
I have read the above information.  I have had all my questions and concerns 
answered. By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.  
 
 
Signature: _______________________________________________  
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Appendix E: Demographics Measure 
 
Please complete the following items. 
 
1. What is you gender? 
__ Male __ Female  
 
2. What is your race/ethnicity? 
__ Caucasian/White __ Black or African American 
__ Asian/Pacific Islander __ American Indian or Alaska native 
__ Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin 
 
4. What is your age? 
Age: ______ 
 
5. What is your current employment status? 
__ Full time __ Part time 
 __ Not currently employed 
 
5b. If employed, how many years of work experience do you have? 
 
___ None  ___ 6 months – 1 year 
____1-2 years  ___2-5 years     
____5-10 years ___ more than 10 years 
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Appendix F: Informed Consent (In-lab stage) 
 
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
How Do You Decide? A Decision making Study: Part II 
 
Principal Investigator: Shanique Brown 
 
Institution: DePaul University, Chicago, Illinois, USA 
 
Department (School, College): Department of Psychology 
 




What is the purpose of this research? 
We are asking you to be in a research study because we are trying to learn more 
about decision making.  This study is being conducted by Shanique Brown, a 
graduate student at DePaul University as a requirement to obtain her Doctoral 
degree. This research is being supervised by her faculty advisor, Suzanne Bell. 
 
We hope to include about 180 people in the research. 
 
Why are you being asked to be in the research? 
You are invited to participate in this study because you are likely to engage in 
some decision making behaviors on a daily basis. You must be age 18 or older to 
be in this study. This study is not approved for the enrollment of people under the 
age of 18. 
 
What is involved in being in the research study? 
The exact procedure will involve: 
 You will complete a series of pre-task measures for about 30 minutes. 
 You will complete a 15-training on the use of Microsoft Excel, and a 10-
minute test of your understanding of the material presented in the training 
 You will complete a 15-minute task. 
 Finally, you will complete a brief measure lasting about 5 minutes. 
 
How much time will this take? 
This study will take about 75 minutes to complete.  
 
Are there any risks involved in participating in this study? 
Being in this study does not involve any risks other than what you would 
encounter in daily life.  You may feel uncomfortable or embarrassed about 
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answering certain questions.  You do not have to answer any question you do not 
want to.  
    
Are there any benefits to participating in this study? 
You will not personally benefit from being in this study.   
 
We hope that what we learn will help other researchers and practitioners to 
improved resource allocation performance.  
 
Is there any kind of payment, reimbursement or credit for being in this study? 
You will be given 1.5 research credits for participating in the research. You must 
provide your subject pool number in order to be given credit.  
 
Are there any costs to me for being in the research? 
There is no cost to you for being in the research.  
 
Can you decide not to participate?   
Your participation is voluntary, which means you can choose not to participate.  
There will be no negative consequences, penalties, or loss of benefits if you 
decide not to participate or change your mind later and withdraw from the 
research after you begin participating.  
 
Who will see my study information and how will the confidentiality of the 
information collected for the research be protected? 
The research records will be kept and stored securely. Your information will be 
combined with information from other people taking part in the study. When we 
write about the study or publish a paper to share the research with other 
researchers, we will write about the combined information we have gathered. We 
will not include your name or any information that will directly identify you. We 
will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from 
knowing that you gave us information, or what that information is.  However, 
some people might review or copy our records that may identify you in order to 
make sure we are following the required rules, laws, and regulations.  For 
example, the DePaul University Institutional Review Board may review your 




What if new information is learned that might affect my decision to be in the 
study? 
If we learn of new information or make changes to any portion of the study, and 
the new information or changes might affect your willingness to stay in this study, 
the new information will be provided to you.  If this happens, you may be asked 
to provide ongoing consent (in writing or verbally). 
 
Who should be contacted for more information about the research? 
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Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, 
please ask any questions that might come to mind now.  Later, if you have 
questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about the study or you want to get 
additional information or provide input about this research, you can contact the 
researcher, Shanique Brown at 618-560-3719 or sbrown82@depaul.edu.   
 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the DePaul Institutional Review 
Board (IRB). If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you 
may contact Susan Loess-Perez, DePaul University’s Director of Research 
Compliance, in the Office of Research Services at 312-362-7593 or by e-mail at 
sloesspe@depaul.edu.   
 
You may also contact DePaul’s Office of Research Services if: 
 
 Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the 
research team. 
 You cannot reach the research team. 
 You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent from the Subject:   
 
I have read the above information.  I have had all my questions and concerns 
answered. By signing below, I indicate my consent to be in the research.  
 
 
Signature: _______________________________________________  
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Appendix G: Recall Test (Baseline Performance) 





2. The formula =B1+C1 is located in cell D1. If I dragged the curser down to cell 






d.) None of the 
above 
 
3.  According to the training, the first steps in creating a chart are to: 
a.) Highlight the data and click on the chart wizard icon 
b.) Click on the chart wizard icon and enter data when prompted 
c.) Use Excel’s drawing function to create the chart 
d.) Highlight the data and label the X and Y axes 
4. In order to create a chart to show the average rainfall in each city, I would need 
to:  
a.) Type Average Rainfall in the box labeled “Category (X) axis” 
b.) Type City in the box labeled “Category (X) axis” 
c.) Type City in the box labeled “Category (Y) axis” 
d.) Both A & C are correct 
 
  A B C D 
1 2 4 5 =B1+C1 
2 3 3 4 7 
3 3 7 8 15 
4 5 2 3 ???????? 
5 4 3 4 7 
  A B C 
1 
City Average temperature in 
March 
Average Rainfall in 
March 
2 Rome  28.6 14.2 
3 Seoul  17 .8 
4 Singapore 12.7 3.2 




5. (Refer to the table above) In order to create a bar chart of the average 
temperature in March for the Seoul, Singapore, and Stockholm, I would first need 
to: 
a.) Click on cell A1 
b.) Left click and drag the cursor across cells A3 through B5 
c.) Left click and drag the cursor across cells B3 through C5 








6. Was conditional formatting and/or filtering used to select cities with an average 
temperature in August that is over 90 degrees: 
a.) Conditional formatting 
b.) Filtering 
c.) Both conditional formatting and filtering were used 
7.  The conditional formatting option can be found in what menu at the top of the 
screen in Excel? 
a.) Data 
b.) Home 
c.) Review  
d.) Formulas 
8. Using the Chart Wizard creates a chart using: 
a.) The cell range(s) you selected 
b.) All the data in the sheet  
c.) The last formula you entered 
d.) Data from columns A & B 
5 Stockholm  39 4.5 











90 99 102 
3 Istanbul  78 80 79 
4 Kingston  90 89 94 
5 London  73 76 79 
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9. When using conditional formatting, press the ______ key to move to the 
dialogue box on the right. 




10.  The filtering option can be found in what menu at the top of the screen in 
Excel? 
a.) Insert 
b.) Page Layout 
c.) View 
d.) Data 
11. From the filtering menu, what two pieces of information do you need to 
provide? 
a.) Comparisons (e.g., less than or greater than) and colors 
b.) Colors and values (e.g., 65) 
c.) Comparisons (e.g., less than or greater than) and values (e.g., 65) 
d.) Comparisons (e.g., less than or greater than) and a range of cells (e.g., a4:j4)  
 
 12. Which Excel tool reduces the data that you see on screen? 
 
a.) Chart Wizard 
b.) Conditional formatting 
c.) Filtering 
d.) Inserting formulas 
 13. Which Excel tool highlights information by color? 
a.) Chart Wizard 
b.) Conditional formatting 
c.) Filtering 
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Appendix H: Task-specific Self-Efficacy Measure 
 
Now that you have read the instructions for task, please respond to the following 
items indicating how confident you are in your ability to complete the upcoming 
task.  
0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100  
Not at all Confident   Moderately Confident   
 Completely Confident  
1 – I feel confident that I can carry out the Excel task 
2 – I believe I will be good at carrying out the task 
3 – I will be able to perform this task easily 
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Appendix I: Study Debrief 
 
Thank you for your participation in our research study, How Do You Decide? A 
Decision-making Study. 
I would like to discuss with you in more detail the study you just participated in 
and to explain exactly what we were trying to study. 
 Before I tell you about all the goals of this study, however, I want to explain why 
it is necessary in some kinds of studies to not tell people all about the purpose of 
the study before they begin. 
 As you may know, scientific methods sometimes require that participants in 
research studies not be given complete information about the research until after 
the study is completed. Although we cannot always tell you everything before you 
begin your participation, we do want to tell you everything when the study is 
completed. 
 We don't always tell people everything at the beginning of a study because we do 
not want to influence your responses. If we tell people what the purpose of the 
study is and what we predict about how they will react, then their reactions would 
not be a good indication of how they would react in everyday situations. 
In this study, we are trying to understand how people allocate their time while 
working on a task but are faced with distractions. We are trying to better 
understand if people who have high working memory capacity spend more or less 
time on their task if they are told to focus on their goal. To assess this, you were 
randomly assigned to either a condition where we asked you to focus on your 
goal, or to a condition where we asked you to focus the nature of the information 
related to the task. These different conditions represent either a top-down (goal-
focus), or a bottom-up (task-focused) way of thinking. While you were working 
on the task, we monitored the time you spent on each using the software called 
ManicTime. This software keeps tracks of the time with spend working within a 
program on a computer. 
 Additionally, one of the emails that you received during the study asked you to 
provide contact information for additional participants for the study. This email, 
like the other emails that you received during the task was only sent as a possible 
distractor from the Excel task. There is no drawing for a $100 gift card. In the 
event that you responded to the email with contact information for others, this 
information will be discarded. Further, the email mentioned that entering the 
drawing will disqualify you from earning Sona Credits for your participation 
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today. This information was inaccurate—you will receive credit for your 
participation as stated in the informed consent. 
 If other people knew the true purpose of the study, it might affect how they 
behave/answer questions, so we are asking you not to share the information we 
just discussed. 
 Now that the study has been explained, if you would like for your data to be 
removed from the study, please inform the research assistant before leaving. If 
you decide to have your data removed, we will remove both your pre-lab and lab 
data. 
 I hope you enjoyed your experience and I hope you learned some things today. If 
you have any questions later please feel free to Shanique Brown at 
sbrown82@depaul.edu or by phone at 618-560-3719. 
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Appendix J: Screen-shots of Working Memory Test 
 




Instructions for practice task (remembering letters) 
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Sample incorrect response to practice task (remembering letters) 
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Instructions to practice task for math problems 
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Appendix K:  Conscientiousness Measure 
 
Indicate your level of agreement with the extent to which the following statements 
describe your own behavior on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). 
 
1= Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
 
+ keyed 
 Am always prepared. 
  Pay attention to details. 
  Get chores done right away. 
  Carry out my plans. 
  Make plans and stick to them. 
  Complete tasks successfully. 
  Do things according to a plan. 
  Am exacting in my work. 
  Finish what I start. 
  Follow through with my plans. 
    
– keyed  
Waste my time. 
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  Find it difficult to get down to work. 
  Do just enough work to get by. 
  Don't see things through. 
  Shirk my duties. 
  Mess things up. 
  Leave things unfinished. 
  Don't put my mind on the task at hand. 
  Make a mess of things. 
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Appendix L: Goal Orientation Measure 
 
Indicate your level of agreement with the extent to which the following statements 
describe your own behavior on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). 
1. I prefer challenging and difficult classes so that I’ll learn a great deal. 
2. I truly enjoy learning for the sake of learning. 
3. I like classes that really force me to think hard. 
4. I’m willing to enroll in a different course if I can learn a lot by taking it. 
5. It’s important that others know that I am a good student. 
6. I think that it’s important to get good grades to show how intelligent you 
are. 
7. It’s important for me to prove that I am better than others in the class. 
8. To be honest, I really like to prove my ability to others. 
9. I would rather drop a difficult class than earn a low grade. 
10. I would rather write a report on a familiar topic so that I can avoid doing 
poorly. 
11. I am more concerned about avoiding a low grade than I am about learning. 
12. I prefer to avoid situations in classes where I could risk performing poorly. 
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Appendix M: Experience with Excel 
 
 
1) How frequently do you use Microsoft Word? 
 
a) Multiple times per day 
b) A few times per week 
c) Once per week 
d) A few per month 
e) Once per month 
f) Never 
 
2) How frequently do you use Microsoft PowerPoint? 
a) Multiple times per day 
b) A few times per week 
c) Once per week 
d) A few per month 
e) Once per month 
f) Never 
 
3) How frequently do you use Microsoft Outlook? 
a) Multiple times per day 
b) A few times per week 
c) Once per week 
d) A few per month 
e) Once per month 
f) Never 
 
4) How frequently do you use Microsoft Publisher? 
a) Multiple times per day 
b) A few times per week 
c) Once per week 
d) A few per month 
e) Once per month 
f) Never 
 
5) How frequently do you use Microsoft OneNote? 
a) Multiple times per day 
b) A few times per week 
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c) Once per week 
d) A few per month 
e) Once per month 
f) Never 
 
6) How frequently do you use Microsoft Excel? 
a) Multiple times per day 
b) A few times per week 
c) Once per week 
d) A few per month 
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Appendix O: Experimental Protocol 
 
Instructions for Experimenters 
Please follow the following protocol exactly when running the experiment; 
standardization ensures that sessions can be compared. Each participant should 








-20 Check for 
availability: 
- lab room 








1. Log onto lab machine using your 
CampusConnect username and 
password. 
2. Put the “Experiment in Progress” 
sheet on the door.  
3. Check the Participation List to see:  
a. The Experiment ID of new 
participants you are waiting 
for 
b. The cue conditions 
randomly assigned to them: 
i. 1 = Task Cue 
ii. 2 = Goal Cue 
iii. 3 = Both Task and 
Goal Cues 
iv. 4 = No Cues 
4. Check the volume of the computer 
and increase if too low. 
5. Open the link for the cognitive 
ability test; minimize window. 
6. Open the link for the working 
memory test; minimize window. 
7. Open the ManicTime program and 
ensure this is running in the 
background. 
8. Open Qualtrics link for survey 
(task self efficacy and post-task 
survey); minimise window. 











file for them 
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data sheet, and paste it to the top 
right corner of the Desktop. Once a 
copy is on the desktop, rename it. 
All Excel sheets should be named 
with the participant number. 
10. Go to your Research folder and 
open the training video. Press 
STOP to make sure the video 
starts from the beginning. 
11. Check your participant folder to 
ensure it includes the appropriate 
paperwork for each participant, in 
the following order. 
 1. Consent form 
 2. General Instructions 
 3. Task Instructions 
 4. Post-experiment Survey 









Participant arrives at specific lab room.  If 
you are not ready, ask them to wait in 
hallway. 
 
When participant comes in, they should 
put their RESEARCH SYSTEM ID on the 
Experiment Session sheet. This is not their 
Student ID.  











them to list 
their first 
and last 
names so we 






“This is our standard informed consent 
form including some general 
information on the experiment. Take 
Q: Why do I 
have to sign 
this form? 
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Close door 
and put do 
not disturb 
sign outside 
your time to read the document and feel 
free to ask me any questions.” 
“I will be asking you some questions to 
make sure you understand the consent 
form.” 
 
After participants have read: Ask these 
questions for understanding: “What is the 
purpose of this study? What are the 
benefits? What are the risks?” 











of consent if 




Maximize the window for the working 
memory task and insert the participant ID. 
Inform the participant that he/she has 15 
minutes to complete the test and remind 
him/her to pay close attention to the 
instructions for the test. 
Note: Be 
sure to start 
your timer as 












Maximize the window for the cognitive 
ability and insert the participant ID. 
Inform the participant that he/she has 12 
minutes to complete the test and remind 
him/her to pay close attention to the 
instructions for the test. 
  
Note: Be 
sure to start 
your timer as 







Remove the instructions for the task and 
hand this to participant.  
“These are the instructions for the task; 
you have 3 minutes to review the 
instructions. Please let me know if you 








1. Tell the participant to open the 
Windows Media Player window 
file to file screen, put their 
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headphones on, and to press the 
Blue Circle button at the bottom of 
the screen.  
2. When the video is over, tell 
participants to press the Esc key on 
the keyboard, and to then close the 
Windows Media Player window. 
3. Next, have the participants 
complete the recall test. Inform the 
participant that he/she has 10 
minutes to complete this test. 
55 Excel Task 1. Have the participant complete the 
task-specific self efficacy measure 
using the link provided.  
2. Have participant open the Task 
excel sheet (which you prepared, 
renamed, and placed in the top 
right corner of the Desktop earlier), 
and give the participant the Task 
questions from the folder. Tell the 
participant that s/he has 15 minutes 
to work on the task. Even if they 
can’t finish everything, you should 
take the task sheet back at the end 
of 15 minutes duration. 
3. Remind the participant to save all 
work on the desktop. 
4. Once the participant has completed 
the task, instruct the participant to 
























Make a note 
in the lab 




















75 Wrap-up 1. Thank the participant; remind not to 
discuss the details of the study with 
others who have not completed the 
study. 
2. Open the ManicTime software and 
record the participant’s time spent 
working on the Excel sheet and on 
e-mail in seconds. 
3. Staple all materials and place them 
in the folder labeled “Study Data”.  
4. We also have to keep record of the 
Excel sheets they worked on. Save 
the Excel file (used by participants) 
to our “Data” folder in the Dropbox 
folder labeled “Resource Allocation 
Data”.  
5. Log off.  
6. Remove ‘do not disturb’ sign from 
the door. 
7. Be sure to lock the lab door and 











and add all 
times 
recorded for 
































Other reminders:  Be friendly and welcoming. Know that participants might be 
out in the hallway waiting and may not knock on door.    If there are any 
computer issues – but sometimes just rebooting will clear things up. If there are 
any major issues, please contact me at 618-560-3719. 
